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Abstract. This paper is the product of an  interdisciplinary, interreligious 
dialogue aiming to outline some of the possibilities and rational limits of 
supernatural religious belief, in the light of a critique of David Hume’s familiar 
sceptical arguments – including a rejection of his famous Maxim on miracles – 
combined with a  range of striking recent empirical research. The Humean 
nexus leads us to the formulation of a new ‘Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma’ 
(CCDD), which suggests that the contradictions between different religious 
belief systems, in conjunction with new understandings of the cognitive forces 
that shape their common features, persuasively challenge the rationality of most 
kinds of supernatural belief. In support of this conclusion, we survey empirical 
research concerning intercessory prayer, religious experience, near-death 
experience, and various cognitive biases (e.g. agency detection, theory of mind, 
egocentric and confirmation bias). But we then go on to consider evidence that 
supernaturalism – even when rationally unwarranted – has significant beneficial 
individual and social effects, despite others (such as tribalism) that are far less 
desirable. This prompts the formulation of a  ‘Normal/Objective Dilemma’ 
(NOD), identifying important trade-offs to be found in the choice between our 
humanly evolved ‘normal’ outlook on the world, and one that is more rational 
and ‘objective’. Can we retain the pragmatic benefits of supernatural belief while 
avoiding irrationality and intergroup conflict? It may well seem that rationality 
is incompatible with any wilful sacrifice of objectivity (and we appreciate 
the force of this austere view). But in a  situation of uncertainty, an attractive 
compromise may be available by moving from the competing factions and 
mutual contradictions of ‘first-order’ supernaturalism to a more abstract and 
tolerant ‘second-order’ view, which itself can be given some distinctive (albeit 
controversial) intellectual support through the increasingly popular Fine 
Tuning Argument.  We end by proposing a  ‘Maxim of the Moon’ to express 
the undogmatic spirit of this second-order religiosity, providing a cautionary 
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metaphor to counter the pervasive bias endemic to the human condition, 
and offering a  more cooperation- and humility-enhancing understanding of 
religious diversity in a tense and precarious globalised age.
This paper is the product of a dialogue between two contrasting points 
of view: on the one hand, a  psychologist, sympathetic to spiritual 
perspectives as informed by contemporary empirical research; on the 
other hand, an  analytic philosopher, with a  sceptical and naturalistic 
attitude to religion very much in the spirit of David Hume. Our aim has 
been to outline some of the possibilities and rational limits of supernatural 
belief, in the light of both important recent empirical research and a new 
critique of Hume’s familiar sceptical arguments. Our larger hope is that, 
through this dialogue and by facing up to some of the serious challenges 
to reasoning about religious beliefs from any human perspective, we 
might encourage more progress in interreligious dialogue and in the 
naturalism/supernaturalism debate.
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Our topic is the epistemology of religious belief: specifically, belief 
in supernatural agents such as gods, angels, and spirits. And we are 
concerned with the evidence for (or against) such invisible powers 
derived from reported miracles, religious experiences, and other 
instances of perceived supernatural agency, which we consider to be the 
predominant evidential influence on religious belief.1 Scepticism about 
such proposed instances of supernatural agency has tended to focus 
on either their intrinsic improbability or the contradictions between 
different supernatural accounts. Both of these objections have roots in 
the work of Hume, whose influence is clear in the writing of more recent 
sceptics such as Bertrand Russell and J. L. Mackie. In §II and §III of this 
paper, we shall highlight errors in Hume’s famous arguments, indicating 
that the sceptical case is not nearly as straightforward as its advocates 
often assume. Nevertheless, by combining the lessons to be learned 
from these discussions, we shall formulate a  dilemma that represents 
a significant new challenge to the evidential value of such phenomena:
1 That is, amongst those who self-consciously assess their beliefs and respond to 
evidence. No doubt most people adopt their religious (or anti-religious) views from their 
family and society without much systematic evidential reflection.
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The Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma
That in so far as religious phenomena (e.g. miracle reports, religious 
experiences, or other apparent perceptions of supernatural agency) 
point towards specific aspects of particular religions, their diversity 
and mutual opposition undermines their evidential force; while in so 
far as such phenomena involve a ‘common core’ of similarity, they point 
towards a proximate common cause for these phenomena that is natural 
rather than supernatural.2
The latter part of this dilemma depends on recent empirical discoveries 
which suggest that the general characteristics of religious phenomena 
are broadly  – and increasingly  – explicable in naturalistic terms. In 
§§IV-VI we shall flesh out this claim, drawing on a wide range of recent 
empirical research.3
The Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma (CCDD) is, we believe, 
a serious threat to any form of first-order supernaturalism: supernaturalist 
beliefs that claim unique authority for some particular religious tradition 
in preference to all others.4 But it does not so obviously undermine what 
we call second-order supernaturalism, which maintains that the universe 
in general, and the religious sensitivities of humanity in particular, have 
been formed by supernatural powers working through natural processes. 
Indeed the same natural mechanisms that predispose us towards 
religious belief can be appealed to not only by the atheist – who takes 
them to ‘explain away’ supernaturalist beliefs – but also by the second-
order theist  – who takes them to be tendencies ‘designed in’ to our 
human nature, or at least ‘evolved in’ within a universe designed to foster 
such evolution. Second-order theism is thus likely to be particularly 
attractive to adherents of the Fine-Tuning Argument for the existence 
of God, a  recent and popular variant of the Design Argument which 
2 As we shall see, however, a natural (proximate) common cause is consistent with 
a supernatural ultimate cause.
3 For obvious reasons of space, however, our coverage of the many empirical studies 
has had to be representative and highly selective rather than exhaustive, just as we have 
made no attempt to survey the rich literature spanning the philosophies of science and 
religion.
4 First-order supernaturalism, thus understood, ranges from the very simple (e.g. 
unreflective and literalistic endorsement of one particular religious tradition while 
entirely dismissing all others) to the highly sophisticated (e.g. maintenance of tradition-
specific beliefs, interpreted through reflective theological principles that allow for 
metaphorical understanding and acknowledge some degree of truth in other traditions).
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builds on the apparent discovery of certain ‘anthropic coincidences’ in 
the laws of physics. If the universe has in fact been finely tuned to be 
especially conducive to the evolution of higher life forms with moral 
and religious sensitivities, then it is only to be expected that such life 
forms will proliferate across the multitude of galaxies we observe, and 
that religion will evolve in many different ways, yielding a wide variety 
of specific religious systems. This possibility therefore casts doubt on the 
unique authority of any particular religious orthodoxy, while at the same 
time potentially supporting the theory of a cosmic Designer in a manner 
that is potentially friendly to more general religious attitudes.
The considerations raised in this paper thus leave open the rational 
possibility of second-order theism – or deism – based on philosophical 
argument and on observations abstracted from across the religious 
traditions of humanity. But such a position will fail to satisfy the vast 
majority of believers, including even those philosophers who (like 
F. R. Tennant, Basil Mitchell, and Richard Swinburne) aim to establish 
their theism on the basis of a  ‘cumulative case’ that supplements the 
theistic arguments with an appeal to historical records and contemporary 
experience as providing evidence of specific supernatural intervention in 
human history. Indeed, if the distinctive claims of all religious traditions 
are mutually defeating  – as the Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma 
suggests – then it might seem that the evidential basis even for second-
order supernaturalism is crucially undermined, leaving naturalism as the 
default winner between the remaining rational options (e.g. on grounds 
of ontological parsimony).
At this point, however, the theist has available an unexpected response 
that deserves more attention than it has hitherto been given, fighting 
back using the atheist’s own empirical weapons. For given the recent 
psychological evidence that we are naturally prone to religious thinking, 
some might conclude that such natural tendencies should be embraced, 
especially where they are empirically associated – as sometimes proves 
to be the case – with various aspects of healthy mental functioning and 
personal benefits. In §VII we thus introduce a second dilemma, which is 
more practical than epistemological, and can potentially play a role (as we 
shall further see in §VIII) in the case for second-order supernaturalism:
The Normal/Objective Dilemma
If the psychological causes of religious belief are associated with normal, 
healthy, mental functioning and various positive (individual and social) 
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outcomes, should these rationally weigh with us more heavily than 
objective epistemological considerations would allow?
This quandary bears interesting – and somewhat ironic – comparison 
with the ‘very dangerous dilemma’ famously raised by Hume’s own 
philosophical thinking at the end of Book 1 of his Treatise of Human 
Nature.5 Having concluded that purely rational, objective thinking 
leads to total scepticism, from which we are saved only by the irrational 
intrusions of the human imagination, Hume balances the follies to 
which we are led if we allow the imagination to dominate against the 
crippling scepticism that reason, unaided by the imagination, delivers: 
‘We have, therefore, no choice left but betwixt a false reason and none 
at all’ (T  1.4.7.7). Hume’s own answer to this dilemma is unclear  – 
and its interpretation is controversial  – but it involves at least some 
subordination of pure reason to more practical considerations, and even 
perhaps to the emotions. One of the authors of the current paper6 inclines 
towards an answer to these dilemmas suggested by Hume’s later thought 
in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,7 an answer that may 
vindicate objective reason so as to enable it to provide a dispassionate 
critique of religion. The other author is more sympathetic to our need, as 
psychological beings, to accommodate our natural religious tendencies 
within our intellectual lives. But both of us are agreed that there is plenty 
of scope for reasonable debate here, and the verdict is less clear cut than 
is commonly supposed by enthusiasts on either side.
II. REJECTING HUME’S MAXIM ON MIRACLES
Although Humean themes will feature strongly here, we explicitly reject 
two of Hume’s most familiar claims about belief in miracles. The first of 
these is the famous Maxim which concludes his theoretical discussion of 
testimony for miracles in Part 1 of Enquiry Section 10:
5 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature: A Critical Edition, Vol. 1, ed. by David Fate 
Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1739/40] 2007); subsequently 
cited in text as ‘T’ followed by location in the standard format of book.part.section.
paragraph.
6 See Peter Millican, ‘Hume’s Chief Argument’, in The Oxford Handbook of Hume, ed. 
by Paul Russell (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
7 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by Peter Millican 
(Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, [1748] 2007); subsequently cited in text as 
‘E’ followed by location in the standard format of section.paragraph.
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‘That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony 
be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the 
fact, which it endeavours to establish: ... ’ (E 10.13, quotation marks in 
original)
This Maxim can be interpreted in a number of ways, some of which are 
more plausibly true than others (but then correspondingly unexciting). 
John Earman,8 for example, takes Hume to be saying that a miracle report 
should be ascribed a probability of more than 0.5 only if its evidential 
force is such as to render the miracle more probably true than false – 
a plain tautology that is of little use. Another common way of reading the 
Maxim is as asserting that ‘extraordinary claims require extraordinary 
evidence’ – a plausible claim, but too non-specific and ambiguous to be 
directly applied or refuted.9 Slightly more pointedly, the Maxim may be 
understood as encapsulating a dilemma: that the more extraordinary the 
event reported, the less probable the report, so that the religious advocate 
who wishes to render probable the report of a  miracle cannot have it 
both ways. Again this sounds quite plausible, but nothing that Hume says 
provides a solid basis either for this interpretation or for the correctness 
of such a claim.10 We believe that Hume’s intended conclusion was far 
more specific than any of these, and would – if accepted – undermine 
almost any miracle report. As we shall now explain, however, his 
argument for it is faulty.
Hume starts from the very reasonable principle that the evidential 
force of testimony can be known only through induction from experience, 
by which we learn which factors – such as ‘the opposition of contrary 
testimony; ... the character or number of the witnesses; ... the manner of 
their delivering their testimony’ (E 10.7) – are best (or least) correlated 
with true reports. But having explained this, Hume then immediately 
8 John Earman, Hume’s Abject Failure: The Argument Against Miracles (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 41.
9 This precise formulation was used by Carl Sagan (in Cosmos Episode 12), though 
various antecedents can be found dating back to the 18th century. Note that an atheist 
and a theist are likely to disagree regarding the ‘extraordinariness’ of supernatural claims; 
hence deployment of this maxim against such claims is apt to seem question-begging.
10 It is easy to provide a Bayesian argument to the effect that a report’s overall plausibility 
(with the relevant conditional probabilities held constant) must diminish in proportion 
to the prior probability of what is reported. But without some specific argument regarding 
the actual magnitude of the relevant prior and conditional probabilities, it is impossible 
to show that the conditional probability of the miracle, given the testimony, can never 
reach 0.5 or more.
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introduces a further factor to put into this equation:
Suppose, for instance, that the fact, which the testimony endeavours 
to establish, partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous; in that 
case, the evidence, resulting from the testimony, admits of a diminution, 
greater or less, in proportion as the fact is more or less unusual. (E 10.8)
The unusualness of a reported event, Hume argues, should be balanced 
on the other side of the scale against the characteristics of the testimony 
that incline us to believe it, potentially resulting in ‘a counterpoize, and 
mutual destruction of belief and authority’ (E 10.8). The most extreme 
possible case of such ‘counterpoize’ is where the reported fact
instead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous; and  ... the 
testimony, considered apart and in itself, amounts to an  entire proof; 
in that case, there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must 
prevail, but still with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its 
antagonist. (E 10.11; emphasis added)
Notice here how Hume understands the strength of the testimony  – 
‘considered apart and in itself ’ – as yielding a single overall measure of 
proof which can then appropriately be weighed against the strength of 
the counter-proof that arises from the miraculousness (i.e. the extreme 
lack of conformity to our uniform experience) of the alleged event.11 The 
stronger of these two proofs ‘must prevail, but still with a diminution 
of its force, in proportion to that of its antagonist’. So the confidence we 
place in the testimony (or – depending on which way the scales point – 
in the inductive evidence against the supposed event) will depend on the 
extent to which the testimonial proof (or alternatively the proof from 
experience) over-balances its antagonist (see diagram overpage).
Thus the overall credibility depends on this contest between the proof 
constituted by the inductive evidence in favour of the testimony ‘considered 
apart and in itself ’ (weighing down on the left-hand tray) and the proof 
constituted by the uniform evidence of nature against the reported event 
(weighing down on the right-hand tray). We have ‘proof against proof ’, 
with the overall credibility given not by either ‘proof ’ individually, but by 
11 Millican (‘Twenty Questions about Hume’s “Of Miracles”’, in Philosophy and 
Religion: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 68, ed. Anthony O’Hear, 2011, pp. 
152–92) refers to this as Hume’s ‘Independence Assumption’, explaining both its key role 
in Hume’s argument (§8) and its failure in cases where testimony can be false in many 
ways (§19), as briefly discussed below. For explication of Hume’s notion of ‘proof ’, see §2 
and §6 of the same paper.
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the result of weighing them against each other.12 In the setup illustrated 
below, this will be indicated by the direction of the pointer at the top of 
the scales once they have settled.
 
Credibility 
In favour of the testimony 
Consistency of the testimony 
Good character of the witnesses 
Number of the witnesses 
Convincing manner of delivery 
Against the testimony 
Unusualness of the event 
Just two paragraphs later,13 Hume reaches the famous Maxim which is 
the culmination of Section 10 Part 1:
Hume’s Maxim on Miracles
The plain consequence is (and it is a  general maxim worthy of our 
attention), ‘That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the 
testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, 
12 This refutes Earman’s interpretation (Earman, Hume’s Abject Failure: The Argument 
Against Miracles, p. 41; ‘Bayes, Hume, Price, and Miracles’, Proceedings of the British 
Academy, 113 (2002), 91–109 (p. 97)), which would instead involve a calculation, prior to 
the weighing operation, of two overall judgements – namely the conditional probability 
(given the testimony) of the event, and of its absence – which are then put in the balance 
against each other.
13 The intervening paragraph 12 makes the point that any alleged miracle is ipso facto 
an event that would be maximally out of line with past experience, and hence will have 
a minimal inductive probability. Hume’s reference to ‘laws of nature’ in that paragraph 
has led some to misunderstand him as treating miracles as a special case, but in fact his 
argument is clearly intended to be a straightforward application of the general principles 
he has already expounded. For discussion of the controversial interpretative issues raised 
by this paragraph, see Millican, ‘Twenty Questions about Hume’s “Of Miracles”’, §§10-12.
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than the fact, which it endeavours to establish  ... ’ (E  10.13, emphasis 
added)
The rest of the paragraph makes clear that here testimony ‘sufficient to 
establish’ some event means testimony sufficient to render the event 
more probable than not; while ‘more miraculous’ here is to be read simply 
as ‘less [initially] probable’.14 The language of the Maxim again indicates 
that Hume understands any ‘kind’ of testimony as having a  typical 
probability of falsehood ‘considered apart and in itself ’, independently of 
the particular event reported – let us call this probability f. And it is this 
general probability of falsehood (inductively derived from our experience 
of that kind of testimony) which is to be weighed in the balance against 
m, the initial probability of the event reported (inductively derived from 
our experience of that kind of event), to discover which is the more likely.
All this might seem fairly straightforward, but there is a  serious 
fallacy in Hume’s reasoning which was indirectly pointed out by some 
contemporary critics but has been generally overlooked more recently. 
To put the point crudely, his Maxim can work well if there is only one 
way of the testimony’s being false (e.g. with a yes/no medical diagnostic 
test), but fails if it is possible for testimony of the relevant kind to be false in 
many different ways. For in the latter case, when testimony is presented 
in favour of some alleged event M, and we assess the relative probability 
of the following two alternatives:
True positive report:testimony is true – M did in fact occur,
False positive report:testimony is false – M did not in fact occur,
the latter probability cannot appropriately be calculated in terms of the 
simple ‘probability of falsehood’ f.15 If testimony can be false in many 
different ways, then the specific probability of a false positive report of M 
in particular is likely to be much lower than the non-specific probability 
of falsehood in general, and the testimony correspondingly becomes 
14 See Millican, ‘Twenty Questions about Hume’s “Of Miracles”’, §7 for the textual 
detail.
15 This therefore undermines the derivation of Hume’s Maxim, which follows if one 
is permitted to calculate the initial probability of a true positive report as (1 – f)×m and 
the probability of a false positive report as f×(1 – m). The former dominates the latter 
if and only if m is greater than f, yielding something like a straight contest between the 
miracle testimony and the ‘testimony of nature’, which seems to be the thought behind 
Hume’s reasoning. For more discussion, see Millican, ‘Twenty Questions about Hume’s 
“Of Miracles”’, §§7-8.
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more credible as the probability of a false positive M-report decreases. 
The relevant question, when faced with a  report of M, becomes not 
‘how likely is it that this person would report some falsehood or other?’, 
but rather, ‘how likely is it that this person would falsely report M in 
particular?’.
Some nice examples that can be used to illustrate this point were given 
by both George Campbell (1762) and Richard Price (1768), the most 
philosophically acute of Hume’s early critics. But such cases had already 
been anticipated in 1736 by Joseph Butler, in a  discussion explicitly 
quoted by both Campbell and Price:16
There is a very strong presumption against ... the most ordinary facts, 
before the proof of them; which yet is overcome by almost any proof. 
There is a presumption of millions to one, against the story of Caesar, 
or of any other man. For suppose a number of common facts so and so 
circumstanced, of which one had no kind of proof, should happen to 
come into one’s thoughts; every one would, without any possible doubt, 
conclude them to be false. And the like may be said of a single common 
fact.17
After quoting Butler, Campbell continues:
What then, I may subjoin, shall be said of an uncommon fact? In order 
to illustrate the observation above cited, suppose, first, one at random 
mentions, that at such an  hour, of such a  day, in such a  part of the 
heavens, a comet will appear; the conclusion from experience would be 
not as millions, but as infinite to one, that the proposition is false. Instead 
of this, suppose you have the testimony of but one man of integrity, who 
is skill’d in astronomy, that at such an hour, of such a day, in such a part 
of the heavens, a comet did appear; you will not hesitate one moment to 
give him credit.18
Thus Hume’s Maxim  – despite its evidently widespread seductive 
appeal – gives absurd results if applied to everyday and non-miraculous 
16 For Campbell, see below. Richard Price, On the Importance of Christianity and the 
Nature of Historical Evidence, and Miracles: Dissertation IV of Four Dissertations, second 
edition (London: A. Millar and T. Cadell, 1768) provides a lottery example at §2, pp. 407-
9, and acknowledges Butler on pp. 440-2.
17 Joseph Butler, Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and 
Course of Nature, ed. by W. E. Gladstone (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1736] 1896), II ii 3 
[§11].
18 George Campbell, A  Dissertation on Miracles (Edinburgh: A. Kincaid & J. Bell, 
1762), I §1, p. 31.
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cases. To take Campbell’s example of a comet, it was surely antecedently 
vanishingly improbable that a  comet should, on the night after which 
the first version of this paper was presented, be visible in a  clear sky 
between the stars δ- and ω-Piscium. Yet having seen this reported in the 
newspapers,19 we rightly believed it. The general probability of an error in 
such a newspaper report – let us suppose this to be 1% – is vastly greater 
than the tiny initial probability of the event reported. So according to 
Hume’s Maxim the report should not be credible. But we are right to 
believe it because the crucial probability that has to be compared with 
that of the event reported is not the general probability of error in such 
reports, but rather, the specific probability that the newspaper would 
erroneously report a comet in just that position. This specific probability 
is even tinier than the probability that a  comet would actually appear 
there – indeed presumably around 100 times less (given a 1% general 
frequency of errors).
Hume certainly knew of Campbell’s objections (and probably Price’s 
also),20 but he did not revise his argument, perhaps because he failed 
to remember, or misunderstood, the Maxim for which he himself had 
argued. We noted above that it is often interpreted in ways that seem 
obviously true – even vacuous – and it might be that Hume had such 
an interpretation in mind when considering Campbell’s objections, and 
hence failed to appreciate their force. More charitably, we suspect that 
he may have had in mind a different Maxim, one that is non-vacuous 
yet far more defensible than his own, while remaining very much in the 
same spirit:
Revised Humean Maxim on Miracles
That no testimony is sufficient to establish a  miracle M (i.e. render it 
more probable than not), unless the testimony is of such a kind, that the 
occurrence of a false M report of that kind (given that M does not in fact 
occur) would be even less probable than M itself.
19 The comet C/2011 L4 Pan-STARRS was at that point in the sky when this talk was 
given on 15th March 2013. See, for example: http://www.universetoday.com/100169/
comet-panstarrs-how-to-see-it-in-march-2013/ [accessed 09/03/2013].
20 Hume wrote to Hugh Blair in 1761 discussing the manuscript of Campbell’s 
Dissertation, and then to Campbell himself in 1762 (David Hume, The Letters of David 
Hume, ed. by John Young Thomson Greig (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), Vol. I, 
pp.  348-51, 360-1). He knew Richard Price personally, but we have no record of his 
making any response to Price’s dissertation on miracles. Neither Campbell nor Price 
spelled out exactly how his argument had gone wrong, so it would be unsurprising if 
Hume failed to appreciate the full significance of their objections.
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This Maxim can be derived mathematically as follows. We begin from the 
observation that the threshold of credibility of an M report (of a given 
kind) comes at the point when such a report is more likely to have been 
generated truly than falsely (i.e. a ‘true positive’ is more likely than a ‘false 
positive’). The probability of occurrence of a true M report is equal to 
the initial probability of M (call this m) multiplied by the probability 
that M, given that it occurs, will be truly reported (for simplicity, call 
this T). The probability of occurrence of a false M report is equal to the 
initial probability of M’s non-occurrence, namely (1–m), multiplied by 
the overall probability that M would be reported given that it does not 
occur (call this F).21 So we now have that testimony for M is credible (if 
and) only if:
(1–m)×F < m×T.
But M is supposedly miraculous, so the initial probability m is tiny. And 
as long as it is not even less probable that M should go unreported if true 
(which it surely isn’t), we have T ≤ (1–m) and hence, multiplying both 
sides by F:
T×F ≤ (1–m)×F.
Stringing our two inequalities together, we get:
T×F ≤ (1–m)×F < m×T
and now taking out the middle term, this yields T×F<m×T, which on 
cancelling Ts leaves:
F<m
Therefore testimony for M is credible in accordance the Revised Maxim 
above. Notice that this Maxim, unlike Hume’s, focuses not on an inverse 
epistemic probability – that a report of M, having been given, is true or 
false – but rather, on a direct causal probability – that a report of M will 
be given in circumstances where M has not, in fact, occurred. And this 
has the virtue of making crystal clear that we have now moved into the 
realm of empirical psychology rather than pure philosophy: the most 
crucial question here is how prone people are to generating reports 
21 F is an average value, and false reporting could be more likely in some circumstances 
than others without undermining this reasoning. But note that both T and F are specific 
to M, and are likely to vary depending on the particular miracle reported – unlike Hume’s 
original Maxim, this revised version does not make the implausible assumption that all 
items of testimony of a given ‘kind’ should have the same typical probability of truth.
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of miracles and religious experiences naturally (i.e. in the absence of 
special supernatural intervention). If it then turns out that this is entirely 
common, the claim that such reports give significant evidence of the 
supernatural is substantially undermined.22
III. CONTRARY RELIGIONS AND A DILEMMA FOR THE BELIEVER
Having erected a high threshold of credibility by means of his Maxim, 
Hume moves on in Part 2 of Enquiry 10 to argue that no actual testimony 
for a  miracle has ever got close to reaching that threshold. He gives 
a  battery of arguments, focusing mainly on the dubious provenance 
of miracle stories, which are quickly propagated through our love of 
‘surprize and wonder’, and the enthusiasm of religionists for ‘promoting 
so holy a cause’ (E 10.17). Hume might also usefully have added here 
some discussion from his Natural History of Religion,23 concerning 
humans’ tendency to ascribe events to gods and spirits, a  disposition 
which also helps to explain both why supernatural miracle stories seem 
so plausible in some cultural settings and why, by contrast, the progress 
of science tends to undermine them:
... We hang in perpetual suspence between life and death, health and 
sickness, plenty and want; which are distributed amongst the human 
species by secret and unknown causes, whose operation is oft unexpected, 
and always unaccountable. These unknown causes, then, become the 
22 Note that both Hume’s original Maxim and our Revised Maxim require some 
judgement regarding the initial probability of the miracle M itself (i.e. m in our formal 
discussion). Moreover, the naturalist and supernaturalist are quite likely to disagree here 
(cf. note 9 above), even if they fully accept the same Maxim. Unfortunately there is no 
systematic way to remove the element of judgement regarding the overall plausibility of 
a supernaturalist world-view: to the atheist, the supposition of a divine realm may be 
a metaphysical extravagance that could only be justified by overwhelming evidence, while 
to the theist, it might seem to be a relatively modest addition of another level of immaterial 
intelligent agents in a world that already contains such agents. These judgements can, 
however, be swayed by empirical evidence, for example of Darwinian evolution and the 
physical basis of consciousness, which have persuaded most contemporary philosophers 
that our own intelligent agency is firmly grounded in the physical world rather than any 
immaterial realm.
23 David Hume, A Dissertation on the Passions; The Natural History of Religion, ed. 
by Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, [1757] 2007); Natural History 
subsequently cited in text as ‘N’ followed by location in the standard format of section.
paragraph.
14 BRANDEN THORNHILL-MILLER & PETER MILLICAN
constant object of our hope and fear ... Could men anatomize nature, ... 
they would find, that these causes are nothing but the particular fabric 
and structure of the minute parts of their own bodies and of external 
objects; and that, by a regular and constant machinery, all the events are 
produced, about which they are so much concerned. But ... the ignorant 
multitude  ... can only conceive the unknown causes in a  general and 
confused manner ...
There is an universal tendency among mankind to conceive all beings like 
themselves ... We find human faces in the moon, armies in the clouds; 
and by a natural propensity, if not corrected by experience and reflection, 
ascribe malice or good-will to every thing, that hurts or pleases us. ... No 
wonder, then, that mankind, being placed in such an absolute ignorance 
of causes, and  ... at the same time so anxious concerning their future 
fortune, should immediately acknowledge a  dependence on invisible 
powers, possessed of sentiment and intelligence. ...
In proportion as any man’s course of life is governed by accident, we 
always find, that he encreases in superstition ... All human life, especially 
before the institution of order and good government, being subject to 
fortuitous accidents; it is natural, that superstition should prevail every 
where in barbarous ages ... (N 3.1-3)
Obviously any such explanation of the origin of religion is to some extent 
speculative, but Hume’s account certainly contains plausible elements.24 
And that humanity has a love of ‘surprize and wonder’ is evident enough: 
the propagation of ‘urban myths’, conspiracy theories, paranormal and 
miracle cures, monster and alien sightings etc. over the web and the 
more sensational media demonstrates sufficiently that this passion is still 
widespread today.
Moving back now to his discussion of miracles, Hume’s next argument 
is more distinctive and philosophically interesting, though also rather 
dubious:
24 Indeed in this passage Hume unites and presages two important modern theories 
of religion: (a) religion as shaped by projection of self and anthropomorphism (Stewart 
Guthrie, ‘A Cognitive Theory of Religion’, Current Anthropology, 1980, 181–203); and (b) 
religion and magic as originating from a need for control in an unpredictable world (e.g. 
Bronislaw Malinowski, Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays (Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday, 1945)). Hume also hints at the hypersensitive agency detection device 
(HADD) and theory of mind (ToM) cognitive mechanisms discussed later. But as we 
shall see in §V, his account of the origin of religion could usefully be supplemented by 
consideration of religious and ‘near death’ experiences.
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I may add as a fourth reason ... that, in matters of religion, whatever is 
different is contrary; and that it is impossible the religions of ancient Rome, 
of Turkey, of Siam, and of China should, all of them, be established on 
any solid foundation. Every miracle, therefore, pretended to have been 
wrought in any of these religions (and all of them abound in miracles), 
as its direct scope is to establish the particular system to which it is 
attributed; so has it the same force, though more indirectly, to overthrow 
every other system. In destroying a rival system, it likewise destroys the 
credit of those miracles, on which that system was established; so that all 
the prodigies of different religions are to be regarded as contrary facts, 
and the evidences of these prodigies, whether weak or strong, as opposite 
to each other. (E 10.24)
This argument, unlike the earlier ones, depends crucially on the idea that 
each miracle claim is being used to support a specific religious belief, from 
which Hume takes it to follow that where those beliefs conflict, the miracle 
claims are in turn rendered indirectly contrary to each other. Putting this 
semi-formally, suppose we receive two reports of extraordinary events 
M1 and M2 which – understood as supernatural miracles – are invoked in 
favour of religious beliefs R1 and R2 respectively.25 Supposing that they do 
indeed provide convincing support for their corresponding religions, we 
have that M1 → R1 and M2 → R2. The contrapositive equivalent of the latter 
is that ¬R2 → ¬M2, while if the two religions conflict (i.e. some essential 
doctrine of R1 is logically incompatible with some essential doctrine of 
R2) then we also have that R1 → ¬R2. Putting all this together, we now have 
M1 → R1, R1 → ¬R2, and ¬R2 → ¬M2, which by transitivity of implication 
yield M1 → ¬M2. This seems, in essence, to be Hume’s argument.
The biggest problem with this line of reasoning is that it works only 
if the implications (symbolised by ‘→’) are all taken to be certain: Hume, 
uncharacteristically, is here failing to notice how differently things fall 
out if the evidential relationships are merely probabilistic. To illustrate 
this, suppose we are faced with just three competing theories: R1, R2 and 
N, where the last is a scientific naturalism that denies any supernatural 
intervention. Suppose also that we are initially inclined to discount the 
supernaturalist theories, so that if our state of belief were to be represented 
25 This wording is intended to make clear that M1 and M2 are here understood as 
specific events (e.g. the reviving of a  man from the dead, or the raising of a  building 
into the air), and do not involve any interpretation of how those events might have been 
caused (e.g. through God’s or other supernatural agency).
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probabilistically, the appropriate figures would be roughly 5% for each of 
R1 and R2, and 90% for N. We then witness an apparently supernatural 
event M1, associated with (and claimed in support of) R1, while the 
believers in R2 either deny its occurrence, ascribe it to a lesser spirit, or 
claim it as performed by their own deity for some reason. If our personal 
experience of the event – and its apparently supernatural character – is 
sufficiently compelling,26 then it might force us to give up our belief in N, 
most likely in favour of R1. But notice that in this situation, our acceptance 
of the miracle could well increase the probability that we assign to R1 
and to R2, by favouring both supernaturalist theories over naturalism 
(we might, for example, end up assigning probabilities of 60% to R1, 
30% to R2, and 10% to N).This revised position would in turn increase 
the credibility of any report of a  supernatural miracle M2 associated 
with (and claimed in support of) R2, thus generating an overall positive 
evidential relationship between M1 and M2. If a sufficiently strong report 
in favour of M2 were then forthcoming, that would only further confirm 
our rejection of N, while presumably levelling up the contest between 
R1 and R2. (We might also, of course, begin to speculate that neither R1 
nor R2 has the whole truth, and consider other options accordingly, but 
the crucial point here is that the antipathy between R1 and R2 need not 
imply any such antipathy between M1 and M2.)
So Hume goes much too far when arguing that miracles ‘pretended to 
have been wrought’ in contrary religions are ‘to be regarded as contrary 
facts’. This would be true only on the supposition that each miracle’s 
occurrence is intimately tied to the truth of the corresponding religion 
(and specifically to those crucial doctrines that make the religions logically 
contrary). Such claims have, no doubt, been advanced by apologists – 
for example, in arguing that Jesus’ miracles prove him beyond doubt 
to have been the Son of God – but they are highly implausible. M1 and 
M2 are not ‘contrary facts’ in themselves, but only through the doctrinal 
implications that have been drawn from them, and it would be entirely 
possible for an adherent of either religion to accept both M1 and M2 while 
denying (at least one of) these doctrinal implications. Indeed, as we have 
seen, M1 and M2 need not be ‘contrary’ even in the weak sense of merely 
making each other less probable, despite the strict contrariety of their 
associated religions, R1 and R2.
26 For the sake of the example we here take for granted that personal witnessing of 
a miraculous event can be sufficiently convincing to compel belief.
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The example just discussed might seem artificial, but it is of 
obvious application to our contemporary situation, in which the key 
contest  – especially given the recent trend towards multi-culturalism 
and acceptance of religious diversity – is arguably not so much among 
different religions, as between supernaturalism as a whole and scientific 
naturalism. From this perspective, some modern believers might be 
entirely happy to appeal relatively indiscriminately to the huge cloud of 
miracle stories available within the combined religious traditions of the 
world, as demonstrating the widespread activity of supernatural powers. 
This would mean, however, giving up the idea that miracles can provide 
any specific vindication of particular theological doctrines, including 
the central doctrine of monotheism. And such a  strategy is therefore 
unlikely to appeal to any conventional Jew, Christian, or Muslim, since 
the abundance of supernatural manifestations reported in diverse 
religious traditions would most naturally point towards polytheism 
instead.27 But there is also another very significant cost to this strategy, 
especially in the context of Hume’s earlier arguments, because the 
widespread proliferation of miracle reports does not necessarily increase 
the likelihood of genuine supernatural activity. The problem here for 
the supernaturalist position is that there are two quite different ways of 
accounting for this proliferation:
(S) Supernatural activity is commonplace throughout the world and 
across the centuries, and is accordingly reported widely.
(N) There is no genuine supernatural activity, but humans are 
naturally drawn towards belief in the supernatural, with a vivid 
imagination driven by hopes and fears, cognitive biases, lack of 
critical judgement, and a delight in miracle stories etc.
27 This is not to deny that a Christian could explain away non-Christian supernatural 
manifestations  – for example, by attributing them to evil spirits or other forces. But 
this very move undercuts any appeal to miracles as a basis for specific religious beliefs, 
because once intermediate supernatural agents (whose veracity cannot be guaranteed) 
are brought into the picture, it becomes obvious that mere humans will be unable to 
tell with any reliability what source any miracle has. Who is to say that an  evil spirit 
could not raise a man from the dead and generate prophecies (etc.) sufficient to convince 
gullible mortals that God is communicating His will to them? Such a spirit might do this 
deliberately in order to inspire the development of incompatible monotheistic religious 
beliefs that are held so fervently as to lead to millennia of bloody conflicts – for more on 
this sort of concern, see Peter Millican, ‘The Devil’s Advocate’, Cogito, 3 (1989), 193–207 
(or <http://www.millican.org/papers/1989DevAdv.pdf> for a corrected version).
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Hume has already proffered a  number of considerations in favour of 
(N), but notice in particular the relevance of his observation at E 10.20 
that widely accepted religious miracles (such as those in the Gospels) 
tend to date from ancient times. The point here is that both (S) and 
(N) imply a broad equivalence between supernatural reports from the 
ancient and the modern world, thus undermining the conventional 
eighteenth-century Protestants’ belief ‘that miracles had long ago 
ceased’.28 This conveniently insulated their supernaturalism from 
contemporary testing, whereas parity between ancient and modern 
removes this insulation, making the supernaturalist hypothesis testable 
through critical examination of some of the profusion of contemporary 
reports of miracles. And if it then turns out – as Hume would expect and 
practical experience seems to show – that most such reports that can be 
carefully and independently investigated are disconfirmed (e.g. as due to 
misinterpretation or illusion, exaggeration or deceit, various cognitive 
biases or simply ‘healings’ that fail to last),29 then this will significantly 
favour (N) over (S). The strategy of appealing to a multitude of witnesses 
can thus seriously backfire, if some of this profusion of testimony – when 
critically investigated – turns out to be due to widespread behaviour or 
psychological phenomena that undermine, rather than confirm, the 
credibility of such reports.30
Although Hume himself does not argue in quite this way, the course of 
his discussion after presenting his ‘contrary religions’ argument strongly 
suggests that he is thinking along broadly similar lines. This would 
explain why he goes on to cite several miracle stories that are relatively 
well attested (and therefore might otherwise seem to weaken, rather 
28 Lorraine Daston, ‘Marvelous Facts and Miraculous Evidence in Early Modern 
Europe’, Critical Inquiry, 18 (1991), 93–124. Hume echoes this general belief at T 3.1.2.7.
29 Relevant cognitive biases and other processes will be surveyed later. Reports of 
systematic scientific investigations into specific instances of paranormal phenomena may 
be found in a variety of ‘skeptical’ publications. See <http://www.csicop.org/resources> 
for links, including to <http://www.skeptic.com/> and <http://www.randi.org/site/> 
[accessed 12/02/2015].
30 A parallel case might be where a plausible salesman is promoting some supposedly 
wonderful product – for example a ‘miracle cure’ or a ‘dead cert’ investment – with lots 
of apparently strong arguments, endorsements from satisfied customers, and so forth. At 
first one might be fairly easily persuaded that the claims, though surprising, are genuine. 
But the discovery that there is a huge profusion of such salesmen, each with their own 
favoured products and plausible patter, will lead one to conclude that there is a quite 
different explanation for all of this activity.
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than strengthen, his overall case). The point here is not that Christian 
believers are logically compelled to deny the miracles of rival religions 
(as the contrary religions argument would suggest), but rather, that 
these believers will in fact want to deny them. Such denial will no doubt 
largely be motivated by simple scepticism towards rival religious beliefs, 
but it might also reflect an awareness that insufficiently discriminating 
acceptance of the miraculous, by putting Christian miracles on a  par 
with others, both undermines any special claims for Christianity and 
also casts doubt on the entire collection. To echo structurally similar 
thoughts expressed by Hume in a quite different context (T 1.4.7.6), ‘if 
we assent to every’ supposedly well-attested miracle story associated 
with any religion, ‘beside that’ these religions ‘are often contrary to 
each other’, such stories will ‘lead us into such errors, absurdities, and 
obscurities, that we must at last become asham’d of our credulity’.31
In practice, we suspect that few sophisticated Christians exhibit such 
excessive credulity, since they are more likely to deny the existence of 
contemporary Christian miracles (even those endorsed by the Roman 
Catholic Church in canonisation proceedings) than to accept the miracle 
stories of other religions. Wholesale rejection of religious experience, 
however, would be far more problematic, given the major and ongoing 
role that it has played in religious understanding and practice. So in 
this case, a more plausible response to the considerations above may be 
to embrace the universality of these experiences, interpreting them as 
pointing toward the divine in a way that is accessible to those of all faiths. 
This response can be supported by the observation that such experiences 
seem to manifest a  ‘common core’ of characteristics, across different 
times, cultures, and religions. So here, it might seem, Hume’s ‘contrary 
religions’ argument finally loses its bite. But again we encounter a parallel 
problem to the case of miracles, since the very commonality which 
enables the various religious experiences to be mutually supporting  – 
and suggests a common cause – again invites the further suggestion that 
this common cause is natural rather than supernatural. Admittedly, the 
threat to supernaturalism is somewhat different in this case, since the 
naturalist explanation is far less likely to deny the reality of ‘internal’ 
religious experiences than of ‘external’ miracles. But the same internality 
that makes religious experiences relatively secure from objective 
refutation, at the same time stands in the way of any convincing proof 
31 The context is his Treatise quandary mentioned in §I above.
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that they are due to the intervention of supernatural agents rather than 
our own bodies and brains. Meanwhile, their plausibility as evidence 
of such external supernatural agency remains hostage to the fortunes 
of physiological and psychological research, which, as we shall see, 
increasingly threatens to account for them in naturalistic terms.
Putting these points together, the believer in supernatural agency is 
faced with a dilemma in claiming evidence for such agency from either 
miracle reports or religious experiences:
The Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma
That in so far as religious phenomena (e.g. miracle reports, religious 
experiences, or other apparent perceptions of supernatural agency) 
point towards specific aspects of particular religions, their diversity 
and mutual opposition undermines their evidential force; while in so 
far as such phenomena involve a ‘common core’ of similarity, they point 
towards a proximate common cause for these phenomena that is natural 
rather than supernatural.32
We have already seen some philosophical arguments that support this 
dilemma, ranging from our reinterpretation of Hume’s Maxim, which 
stresses the centrality of the causal explanation of (false) miracle reports, 
to our discussion of his ‘contrary religions’ argument, which highlights 
the difficulty of supporting any particular supernaturalist explanatory 
framework when so many conflict. Now it is time to add further 
substance to these points, by turning to recent empirical studies of 
religious phenomena.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH SUPPORTING 
THE SCEPTICAL HORN OF THE CCDD
The first horn of our Dilemma might be called oppositional or sceptical, 
and the second common-core or naturalistic. Empirical research can 
32 As noted in §I above, this last claim is not a priori, but depends on the nature of 
the ‘common core’. If, for example, it turned out to be common  – over a  wide range 
of religions  – that evil people were miraculously struck dead when cursed by a  holy 
person, or if ‘common core’ religious experiences involved revelation of previously 
unknown facts that afterwards turned out to be true, then these things might be most 
easily explicable in terms of a suitably motivated supernatural agent. The problem is that 
the ‘common core’ revealed by systematic investigation seems to contain nothing that 
demands, or corroborates, such supernatural explanation. But recall also from §I  that 
a proximate natural cause is compatible with a deeper supernatural cause, so this does not 
rule out what we have called second-order supernaturalism.
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accordingly support the Dilemma in either of two ways: either by pointing 
to opposing claims from different religions that tend to undermine each 
other, or by revealing a  ‘common core’ of phenomena that turn out to 
be explicable in naturalistic terms. We shall take the latter, naturalistic, 
approach towards religious experiences in §V below. Miracle reports, on 
the other hand, we view more sceptically. Of course, alleged miracles 
are generally hard to assess objectively, owing to their sporadic and 
unpredictable nature.33 But one particularly important and prevalent 
variety of would-be miracles has been studied extensively, with results 
that confirm sceptical expectations.
‘Medical Miracles’ and Intercessory Prayer
One of the most universal forms of miracle popularly claimed as 
evidence for the veracity of supernatural beliefs is the answering of 
prayers, often for the healing of ourselves or others. But a meta-analysis 
of the fourteen most rigorously conducted investigations concluded 
‘There is no scientifically discernible effect for intercessory prayer as 
assessed in controlled studies’.34 While a minority of studies have shown 
some small (but overall equivocal) effects,35 others, including the most 
carefully structured, large-scale, double-blind, randomised study, 
actually showed a substantial, significant negative impact on the health 
outcomes of prayed-for patients36 – findings that critical observers might 
find particularly striking given that the majority of intercessory prayer 
studies have been carried out by researchers of sympathetic Christian 
orientation.37 Those wishing to defend the positive evidential value of 
prayer may respond that experimental methodologies are not, for various 
33 Competing doctrinal claims would be another target of the sceptical approach, 
though these are perhaps even more difficult to assess empirically.
34 Kevin S. Masters, Glen I. Spielmans and Jason T. Goodson, ‘Are There Demonstrable 
Effects of Distant Intercessory Prayer? A Meta-Analytic Review’, Annals of Behavioral 
Medicine, 32 (2006), 21–26 (p. 21).
35 Leanne Roberts and others, ‘Intercessory Prayer for the Alleviation of Ill Health’, 
in Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, 2009 <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/10.1002/14651858.CD000368.pub3/abstract> [accessed 18/05/2014].
36 Herbert Benson and others, ‘Study of the Therapeutic Effects of Intercessory Prayer 
(STEP) in Cardiac Bypass Patients: A Multicenter Randomized Trial of Uncertainty and 
Certainty of Receiving Intercessory Prayer’, American Heart Journal, 151 (2006), 934–42.
37 Masters, Spielmans and Goodson, ‘Are There Demonstrable Effects of Distant 
Intercessory Prayer? A Meta-Analytic Review’.
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reasons, well suited to the evaluation of divine intervention.38 Such 
a response, however, risks being overly deferential to religion and fails to 
appreciate the rational burden of proof suggested by the sceptical horn of 
our Dilemma. For prayer is popularly attributed with the power to effect 
medical cures in many different religions, and is commonly understood 
within them as evidence of specific religious truth. Yet religions conflict 
on the various specifics, so such evidential claims cannot reasonably be 
accepted unless they have solid empirical backing to distinguish them 
from the claims that they implicitly contradict. Without such differential 
support, the best that could be hoped for is evidence of prayer’s efficacy 
in general, which then might perhaps buttress claims for second-order 
supernaturalism. But since empirical studies appear to yield no significant 
positive evidence, we must currently reject such ‘medical miracles’ as 
providing evidence for any form of supernaturalism, even while leaving 
open the theoretical possibility that God (or gods) might act in this way 
‘secretly’ when not being tested.
Despite lack of evidence for the medical efficacy of intercessory prayer, 
high regard for the power of prayer as a general personal practice may be 
more justified, based upon its substantial positive effects on subjective 
well-being39 and interpersonal relations,40 its association with healthy 
behaviour,41 and the genuinely dramatic health improvements that it can 
facilitate through the placebo effect.42 These benefits foreshadow aspects 
38 Ralph W  Hood, Peter C Hill and Bernard Spilka, The Psychology of Religion: 
An Empirical Approach (New York: Guilford Press, 2009), p. 468.
39 John Maltby, Christopher Alan Lewis and Liza Day, ‘Prayer and Subjective Well-
Being: The Application of a Cognitive-Behavioural Framework’, Mental Health, Religion 
& Culture, 11 (2008), 119–29 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13674670701485722> [accessed 
12/02/2015].
40 Ryan H. Bremner, Sander L. Koole and Brad J. Bushman, ‘“Pray for Those Who 
Mistreat You”: Effects of Prayer on Anger and Aggression’, Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 37 (2011), 830–37 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167211402215> 
[accessed 12/02/2015]; Nathaniel M. Lambert, Frank D. Fincham, Dana C. LaVallee, and 
others, ‘Praying Together and Staying Together: Couple Prayer and Trust’, Psychology of 
Religion and Spirituality, 4 (2012), 1–9 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0023060> [accessed 
12/02/2015].
41 See for example, Nathaniel M. Lambert, Frank D. Fincham, Loren D. Marks, and 
others, ‘Invocations and Intoxication: Does Prayer Decrease Alcohol Consumption?’, 
Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 24 (2010), 209–19 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/
a0018746> [accessed 12/02/2015].
42 Anne Harrington, ‘The Placebo Effect: What’s Interesting for Scholars of Religion?’, 
Zygon, 46 (2011), 265–80 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9744.2010.01188.x> 
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of the ‘Normal/Objective Dilemma’ which will be discussed later. Even 
more directly, however, they point forward to the second ‘naturalistic’ 
horn of our primary Dilemma.
V. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH SUPPORTING 
THE NATURALISTIC HORN OF THE CCDD
The naturalistic horn of our Dilemma – for obvious reasons – has far 
more scope for support from empirical research. Indeed, as we shall 
see, important new research from the psychology of religion, religious 
studies, and the cognitive science of religion now offers the prospect of 
persuasive naturalistic explanation for what appears to be a  ‘common 
core’ of key religious phenomena such as religious experiences, afterlife 
beliefs, and the apparent perception of supernatural agency.
Meditative and Introvertive Religious Experience
According to the ‘perennial philosophy’, a position espoused by scholars 
such as William James,43 Walter Stace,44 and Ninian Smart,45 there 
exists a  common core to religious experiences across human cultures 
and religious traditions. Opposing this, ‘constructivists’ or diversity 
theorists, such as Steven Katz46 and Wayne Proudfoot,47 have argued that 
religious experiences are constructed by – or at least are not separable 
from  – language, culture, tradition, and context.48 More recently, we 
have seen a resurgence of the common core position, riding a wave of 
new empirical evidence. It has also been recognised that a  common 
core position need not deny the role of language, culture, and context, 
[accessed 12/02/2015].
43 William James, The Varieties Of Religious Experience: A Study In Human Nature 
(New York: Longmans Green and Co., 1902).
44 W. T. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1960).
45 Ninian Smart, ‘Interpretation and Mystical Experience’, Religious Studies, 1 (1965), 
75–87 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0034412500002341> [accessed 12/02/2015].
46 Steven T. Katz, Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1978).
47 Wayne Proudfoot, Religious Experience (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1985).
48 For a  detailed critique, from a  humanistic perspective, of the philosophical 
assumptions underpinning this position, see Gregory Shushan, ‘Extraordinary 
Experiences and Religious Beliefs: Deconstructing Some Contemporary Philosophical 
Axioms’, Method and Theory in the Study of Religion, in press.
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nor the role that cognitive appraisal and interpretative processes play in 
shaping underlying experiences. Thus different cultural characteristics 
or objectives can be ‘mixed in’, modulating the individual religious 
experiences that are still, in fundamental ways, similar.49
Further investigations into the biological basis of these experiences 
has revealed that appropriately identified religious experiences appear 
to activate a family of neurobiological systems that are also involved in 
non-religious functions.50 Ingesting entheogens like psilocybin under 
appropriate conditions can also produce experiences qualitatively 
indistinguishable from spontaneously occurring religious experiences,51 
or from those induced by meditation and prayer.52 And psychometric 
studies, making extensive use of the standard measurement of religious 
or mystical experience,53 have shown factor structures supporting 
the existence of a  common core to religious experience in samples of 
Christian, Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist populations, from different 
continents and with varying understandings of the origin and nature 
of their experiences, from within their different cultural, religious, and 
linguistic traditions.54
49 See the following for detailed review and discussion: Ralph W. Hood Jr, Peter C. Hill 
and Bernard Spilka, The Psychology of Religion, Fourth Edition: An Empirical Approach 
(New York: Guilford Press, 2009); Ann Taves, Religious Experience Reconsidered: 
A Building-Block Approach to the Study of Religion and Other Special Things (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2009).
50 Alexander A. Fingelkurts and Andrew A. Fingelkurts, ‘Is Our Brain Hardwired to 
Produce God, or Is Our Brain Hardwired to Perceive God? A Systematic Review on the 
Role of the Brain in Mediating Religious Experience’, Cognitive Processing, 10 (2009), 
293–326 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10339-009-0261-3> [accessed 12/02/2015].
51 R. R. Griffiths and others, ‘Psilocybin Can Occasion Mystical-Type Experiences 
Having Substantial and Sustained Personal Meaning and Spiritual Significance’, 
Psychopharmacology, 187 (2006), 268–83 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00213-006-0457-
5> [accessed 12/02/2015]; Walter N. Pahnke, ‘Drugs and Mysticism’, International 
Journal of Parapsychology, 8 (1966), 295–313.
52 David E. Nichols and Benjamin R. Chemel, ‘The Neuropharmacology of Religious 
Experience: Hallucinogens and the Experience of the Divine’, in Where God and Science 
Meet: How Brain and Evolutionary Studies Alter Our Understanding of Religion (Westport, 
CT: Praeger, 2006), iii, pp. 1–33.
53 Ralph W. Hood, ‘The Construction and Preliminary Validation of a  Measure of 
Reported Mystical Experience’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 14 (1975), 
29–41.
54 Francis-Vincent Anthony, Chris A. M. Hermans and Carl Sterkens, ‘A Comparative 
Study of Mystical Experience among Christian, Muslim, and Hindu Students in Tamil 
Nadu, India’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 49 (2010), 264–77 <http://dx.doi.
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It now appears that much past confusion surrounding religious 
experience derived partly from a  poor taxonomic understanding of 
the phenomena. More recently, both religious55 and neuroscientific56 
studies have converged towards a consensus that ‘religious experience’ 
represents a  heterogeneous group of phenomena that must be 
disaggregated in order to be systematically investigated. By focusing on 
specific features that identify different parts and types of experience, it 
seems that stronger evidence might emerge for a common, biologically 
based, core within these types. One example is that of ‘introvertive 
mystical experience’. Identified as unity devoid of content, or as ‘pure 
consciousness’, it arguably must represent a  tradition-transcending 
‘common core’ since it is an emptying experience – wordless, thoughtless, 
and not constructed by language.57 Although more work needs to be 
done on this topic, when Andrew Newberg and colleagues conducted 
a  comparative neuroimaging study on Franciscan nuns praying and 
Tibetan monks meditating to achieve this state, both groups showed 
decreased activity in the orientation association area of the parietal 
lobe.58 This part of the brain’s right hemisphere provides the sense of 
body and spatial orientation, so when it shuts down, the body seems 
no longer aware of its boundaries or of space and time, making the self 
appear to merge with all things. This work illustrates how taxonomically 
informed and specifically targeted neuroscientific research into various 
types of ‘religious experience’ offers promising prospects for further 
confirmation of the common core thesis. But as we shall see, there is 
org/10.1111/j.1468-5906.2010.01508.x> [accessed 12/02/2015]. Zhuo Chen, Ralph W. 
Hood, Jr, Lijun Yang, and P. J. Watson, ‘Mystical Experience Among Tibetan Buddhists: 
The Common Core Thesis Revisited’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 50 (2011), 
328–38 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5906.2011.01570.x> [accessed 08/03/2015].
55 Ann Taves, Religious Experience Reconsidered: A  Building-Block Approach to the 
Study of Religion and Other Special Things (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
56 Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, ‘Is Our Brain Hardwired to Produce God, or Is Our 
Brain Hardwired to Perceive God? A  Systematic Review on the Role of the Brain in 
Mediating Religious Experience’.
57 Robert K. C. Forman, The Problem of Pure Consciousness : Mysticism and Philosophy 
(New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Robert K. C. Forman, The Innate 
Capacity: Mysticism, Psychology, and Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1998).
58 Andrew Newberg and others, ‘Cerebral Blood Flow during Meditative Prayer: 
Preliminary Findings and Methodological Issues’, Perceptual and Motor Skills, 97 (2003), 
625–30 <http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pms.2003.97.2.625> [accessed 12/02/2015].
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already persuasive new evidence both within and outside the lab that 
some other types of religious experience have a tradition-transcending 
cause that is likely of natural origin.
Near-Death Experiences and the Universal Origin of Afterlife Beliefs
As the name of the category suggests, near-death experiences (NDEs) 
involve a  recognised core of phenomena, and they are interpreted as 
religious within many different traditions. Gregory Shushan has recently 
produced an  important survey of five major, geographically distant, 
linguistically isolated, early world traditions with little or no known 
cultural influence on each other.59 Analyzing diverse written accounts 
of afterlife beliefs from Old and Middle Kingdom Egypt, Sumeria and 
Old Babylonian Mesopotamia, India, Pre-Buddhist China, and Pre-
Columbian Mesoamerica, he demonstrates that the same nine features 
of NDEs are found with striking consistency.60 Shushan has also, with 
similar results, extended these findings to anthropological data on 
extremely isolated indigenous groups from several parts of the world in 
modern history.61
Making this material even more threatening to first-order super-
naturalism is Shushan’s documentation that a  substantial number of 
these more modern groups (that have ethnographic records or can be 
queried) directly state that NDEs are the origin of their beliefs concerning 
the afterlife – the same causal chain of NDEs leading to new-found belief 
in the afterlife that is commonly witnessed in modern medical settings.62 
Contemporary clinical experience independently corroborates the 
existence of a cross-culturally consistent common core to NDEs which, 
59 Gregory Shushan, Conceptions of the Afterlife in Early Civilizations: Universalism, 
Constructivism and Near-Death Experience (London; New York: Continuum International 
Publishing Group, 2009), vi.
60 Namely: Out-of-body experience (OBE), viewing of one’s body, entering/emerging 
from darkness, encounters with ancestors or dead relatives, presence of beings of light, 
judgement/evaluation (or life review), reaching obstacles/barriers or limits, journeys to 
other realms (home or origin), and experience of ‘oneness’ and association of self with 
ultimate reality or the divine.
61 Gregory Shushan, ‘Near-Death Experience and the Origins of Afterlife Beliefs’ 
(presented at the Ian Ramsey Centre Seminar Series on Science and Religion, University 
of Oxford, 2012).
62 Pirn van Lommel and others, ‘Near-Death Experience in Survivors of Cardiac 
Arrest: A Prospective Study in the Netherlands’, The Lancet, 358 (2001), 2039–45 <http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(01)07100-8> [accessed 12/02/2015].
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being observed in both children and adults,63 including atheists and even 
the congenitally blind,64 seems universal and unconditioned by partic-
ular beliefs or past experience. Further demonstrating the fallibility of 
the supernaturalist conclusions that people are likely to draw from such 
an  experience, Thomas Metzinger’s research suggests that people who 
have a similar experience – no matter how it happens or may be falsely 
induced – will, for example, feel as though they genuinely left their body.65
Many researchers have turned their attention to NDEs over the 
last decade or so, with a  wide range of competing physiological and 
psychological hypotheses vying to account for them.66 Since these 
experiences are associated with extreme physical trauma (involving 
sense organs, blood flow, breathing, neurotransmitters and brain 
chemistry etc.), often combined with mental stress (including pain, fear, 
panic, thoughts of mortality etc.) and then followed by physiological 
and psychological relief as the patient recovers,67 it is not surprising that 
there are plenty of potential explanatory candidates. So although there 
is as yet no comprehensive and generally agreed explanation of near-
death experiences, it seems likely that some such naturalistic explanation 
(or combination of explanations) will eventually be forthcoming.68 
The alternative supposition – that they involve genuine perceptions of 
supernatural encounters with God, ancestors, or other spirits – seems 
by contrast metaphysically extravagant, and is hard to square with the 
range of interpretation to which they are subject, depending on the 
religious tradition. Admittedly the interpretation given often fits well 
63 Enrico Facco and Christian Agrillo, ‘Near-Death Experiences between Science 
and Prejudice’, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6 (2012) <http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/
fnhum.2012.00209> [accessed 12/02/2015].
64 Mark Fox, Religion, Spirituality, and the Near-Death Experience (London; New 
York: Routledge, 2003).
65 Thomas Metzinger, ‘Out-of-Body Experiences as the Origin of the Concept of 
a Soul’, Mind and Matter, 3 (2005), 57–84.
66 Facco and Agrillo, ‘Near-Death Experiences between Science and Prejudice’.
67 NDEs are reported, of course, only by those who recover sufficiently to tell about 
the experience, and temporal memory cannot be relied upon in these circumstances; 
hence some symptoms of NDEs may have their source in the period of recovery, even if 
they are self-ascribed to ‘the moment of death’.
68 Lack of agreement concerning naturalistic explanations is perfectly normal early 
in scientific investigations, and consensus might be particularly difficult to achieve in 
regard to NDEs, given that they involve such a complex variety of interrelated and poorly 
understood medical, physiological and psychological factors.
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with the religious tradition in question, so it is not surprising that these 
experiences are commonly interpreted as evidence for supernaturalism. 
But any such evidence is further undermined if Shushan’s conclusion is 
correct, that religious conceptions of the afterlife have themselves been 
fashioned to fit with NDEs. The upshot is that one of the major features 
of supernatural belief systems – the belief in spirits and life after death – 
harmonises well with the perspective informing the Common-Core/
Diversity Dilemma. Here the diversity in detail of afterlife beliefs tends 
to undermine them all as revelatory of metaphysical truth, while their 
similarities point, not towards a genuinely supernatural basis, but rather, 
towards a common natural cause: the human experience of NDEs across 
all cultures and epochs.
Attribution of Events to Supernatural Agents
Recent research in the cognitive science of religion also provides 
a  persuasive naturalistic explanation for the near-universal tendency 
to attribute events to supernatural agents. Previous studies had often 
explored these phenomena in the same manner as paranormal beliefs 
(e.g. déjà vu, telepathy, clairvoyance, extrasensory perception) and in 
relation to things like personality extremes and psychosis-proneness.69 
Such research indicated, for example, that belief in miraculous events 
and/or paranormal phenomena is associated with tendencies towards 
magical thinking and the finding of meaning in coincidences or 
randomly generated patterns.70 In particular, such beliefs appear to 
be independently associated, in some populations, with a  measurably 
69 Andrew M. Greeley, The Sociology of the Paranormal: A Reconnaissance, Studies in 
Religion and Ethnicity (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1975); Michael A. 
Thalbourne, ‘An Attempt to Predict Precognition Scores using Transliminality-Relevant 
Variables’, Journal of the Society for Psychical Research, 61 (1996), 129–40.
70 Paola Bressan, ‘The Connection between Random Sequences, Everyday 
Coincidences, and Belief in the Paranormal’, Applied Cognitive Psychology, 16 (2002), 
17–34 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/acp.754> [accessed 12/02/2015]. For a review of recent 
studies considering how this and other biases (e.g. transliminality, suggestibility, and 
false memory) foster paranormal belief, see Christopher C. French and Krissy Wilson, 
‘Cognitive Factors Underlying Paranormal Beliefs and Experiences’, in Tall Tales about 
the Mind and Brain: Separating Fact from Fiction, ed. by Sergio Della Sala (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 3–22; and Peter Brugger and Christine Mohr, ‘The 
Paranormal Mind: How the Study of Anomalous Experiences and Beliefs May Inform 
Cognitive Neuroscience’, Cortex, 44 (2008), 1291–98 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
cortex.2008.05.008> [accessed 12/02/2015].
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biased representation of randomness and chance, and the tendency 
to perceive coincidences disproportionately within one’s own life.71 At 
best, however, these studies explain some of the variation we observe in 
supernatural beliefs due to extremes in individual differences. Only with 
the arrival of the cognitive science of religion have we come closer to 
a persuasively comprehensive set of cognitive explanations for why such 
supernatural beliefs have been the norm across cultures and throughout 
human history. Several proposed psychological mechanisms are relevant, 
but the two most important – both of them entirely normal rather than 
pathological  – are the hypersensitive (or hyperactive) agency detection 
device and theory of mind.
Our hypersensitive agency detection device (HADD)72 is the human 
cognitive operator that has been postulated to explain why it is normal 
for us to see agency rather than randomness everywhere in the world 
around us: why we see faces in clouds, attribute illness and bad weather 
to witchcraft, and perceive the hand of fate in our lives rather than the 
action of abstract and impersonal forces. The evolutionary advantage of 
its hyperactivity is commonly explained with the observation that the 
cost of perceiving more agents than actually exist (e.g. mistaking wind 
in the tall grass for a predator) is low, while perceiving too few agents 
(e.g. mistaking a predator for wind) would, at some point, be fatal. Given 
that humans evolved in a  world where a  very high proportion of the 
preventable threats were indeed from perceivable agents – either animal 
or human – this theory seems entirely plausible.
Theory of mind (ToM) refers to the capacity to attribute mental 
states  – such as beliefs, desires, and intentions  – to oneself and to 
others.73 Although the existence of fully-developed ToM in non-human 
animals is controversial,74 in humans it is clearly a  normal, pervasive 
71 Paola Bressan, Peter Kramer and Mara Germani, ‘Visual Attentional Capture 
Predicts Belief in a  Meaningful World’, Cortex, 44 (2008), 1299–1306; Jochen Musch 
and Katja Ehrenberg, ‘Probability Misjudgment, Cognitive Ability, and Belief in 
the Paranormal’, British Journal of Psychology, 93 (2002), 169–77 <http://dx.doi.
org/10.1348/000712602162517> [accessed 12/02/2015].
72 Justin L. Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God? (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira 
Press, 2004).
73 David Premack and Guy Woodruff, ‘Does the Chimpanzee Have a  Theory of 
Mind?’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1 (1978), 515–26 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/
S0140525X00076512> [accessed 12/02/2015].
74 Josep Call and Michael Tomasello, ‘Does the Chimpanzee Have a  Theory of 
Mind? 30 Years Later’, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12 (2008), 187–92 <http://dx.doi.
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influence on the interpretation of events and behaviour. Like the HADD, 
ToM also has a  very plausible evolutionary explanation, drawing on 
the ‘social brain hypothesis’ that humanity’s success as a species results 
from the evolution of mental capacities that allow us to navigate the 
complex social and cooperative problems that arise through co-existing 
in larger – numerically safer and more powerful – communities.75 But as 
with the hyperactivity evident in our HADD, we consistently overextend 
ToM, projecting humanlike qualities of consciousness even to inanimate 
objects and abstract forces, and are thus predisposed to see gods, spirits, 
witches and other agents – whether visible or invisible – acting in the 
world. Along with near-death and out-of-body experiences, and other 
disembodied experiences such as dreams, the naturalness with which 
ToM impels us to continue extending consciousness to the dead provides 
another clear foundation for humanity’s common predilection for belief 
in the afterlife.76 When we naturally speak of things like a car that did not 
‘want to run’ or an ‘angry storm’, we are witnessing the excessive (albeit 
entirely normal) anthropomorphizing operation of ToM, a  process 
which makes it perfectly understandable that we should also worry 
about offending unseen beings or appeasing the invisible dead.
To summarize, HADD and ToM together lead us to find specific 
kinds of meaning and design in randomness, to see the action of 
invisible agents even in unplanned, non-intentional processes, and to 
attempt to relate to such agents as we would to other intentional beings. 
Working together, these two processes  – all by themselves  – seem to 
provide a reasonably persuasive naturalistic explanation for the belief in 
invisible, intelligent supernatural agents like the gods and spirits found 
universally across human cultures. And a growing number of studies are 
adding further support to these theories. For instance, young children 
exhibit ‘promiscuously teleological thinking’,77 taking the existence of 
mountains to be explained by the purpose of giving animals something 
org/10.1016/j.tics.2008.02.010> [accessed 12/02/2015].
75 Robin I. M. Dunbar, ‘The Social Brain Hypothesis’, Brain, 9 (1998), 10; Michael 
Tomasello, The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1999).
76 Jesse Bering, The Belief Instinct: The Psychology of Souls, Destiny, and the Meaning of 
Life (New York: W.W. Norton, 2012).
77 Deborah Kelemen, ‘Are Children “Intuitive Theists”? Reasoning About Purpose 
and Design in Nature’, Psychological Science, 15 (2004), 295–301 <http://dx.doi.org/10.11
11/j.0956-7976.2004.00672.x> [accessed 12/02/2015].
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to climb. And the naturalness of such thinking has also been confirmed 
by other studies, such as those showing how Alzheimer’s patients revert 
to it when their disease strips away the more sophisticated thinking 
that they have previously learned through their education,78 while even 
professional scientists tend to default to teleological thinking when 
placed under time pressure.79
Of further relevance to religion is a close relationship between agency 
detection and social emotions, as seen in studies showing that inducing 
loneliness increases belief in the supernatural and in the tendency to 
anthropomorphise objects.80 One recent brain-imaging study has also 
shown how ToM relates directly to theistic belief: neural activation 
patterns confirm that devout Christians actually do think of God 
as a  person rather than an  abstract entity, recruiting the same social-
cognition brain areas during prayer that they do when talking to a good 
friend.81 And still other studies have revealed our increased tendency 
to see illusory patterns, including non-existent agents, when we are 
made to feel that we lack control of our lives or immediate situation.82 
This mounting tally of empirical evidence has clearly demonstrated the 
naturalness and instinctiveness of our agent-oriented, anthropomorphic 
bias, and also its shaping influence both on supernatural belief and on 
other aspects of our thoughts and feelings. As we shall soon see, other 
pervasive cognitive biases also have an  important role to play in the 
understanding of religious phenomena, and of the relationship between 
rationality and human religious beliefs.
78 Tania Lombrozo, Deborah Kelemen, and Deborah Zaitchik, ‘Inferring Design 
Evidence of a  Preference for Teleological Explanations in Patients with Alzheimer’s 
Disease’, Psychological Science, 18 (2007), 999–1006 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111
/j.1467-9280.2007.02015.x> [accessed 12/02/2015].
79 Deborah Kelemen, Joshua Rottman, and Rebecca Seston, ‘Professional Physical 
Scientists Display Tenacious Teleological Tendencies: Purpose-Based Reasoning as 
a Cognitive Default’,  Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 142:4 (2013), 1074-
1083.
80 Nicholas Epley, Adam Waytz, and John T. Cacioppo, ‘On Seeing Human: A Three-
Factor Theory of Anthropomorphism’, Psychological Review, 114 (2007), 864–86 <http://
dx.doi.org/doi: DOI: 10.1037/0033-295X.114.4.864> [accessed 12/02/2015].
81 U. Schjoedt and others, ‘Highly Religious Participants Recruit Areas of Social 
Cognition in Personal Prayer’, Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 4:2 (2009), 
199-207 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsn050> [accessed 12/02/2015].
82 Jennifer A. Whitson and Adam D. Galinsky, ‘Lacking Control Increases 
Illusory Pattern Perception’, Science, 322 (2008), 115–17 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/
science.1159845> [accessed 12/02/2015].
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VI. THE COMMON CLAIM OF UNCOMMON AUTHORITY
The two horns of our Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma focus 
respectively on the opposition between the distinctive features of various 
religions, and the commonality that can be found in their ‘core’ features. 
Yet these contrasting aspects come together in the common tendency of 
religions to claim special or even unique authority for their distinctive 
doctrines. Here we can appeal to the naturalistic strand of our discussion 
to explain why religions are so assertive and persistent in their claims to 
special authority, even in the face of obvious disagreement from countless 
competing faiths. We shall find that aspects of their very commonality 
explain this phenomenon of enduring opposition.
Egocentric and Confirmation Bias
Among the most powerful and pervasive biases generally distorting 
human perceptions, interpretations, and judgements are the various 
manifestations of human egocentric need and perspective. As a general 
term, ‘egocentric bias’ can refer to a variety of processes related to the 
‘self ’ and its needs that help shape our experience, understanding, 
interpretations, and basic motivations. Such bias helps to explain, for 
example, the typical judgement that one has done more than one’s fair 
share of work on a project, and the common – but often false – perception 
that one’s beliefs or actions are the most natural and appropriate.83
Another set of related and overlapping processes, referred to as 
‘selective perception’, involves the general tendency to view situations 
from one particular frame of reference or to attend to some details 
and not others. One classic study of selective perception, involving 
a particularly violent football game between Dartmouth and Princeton, 
anatomised how partisan observers seemed to have witnessed two 
entirely different games.84 Selective exposure and attention to only 
certain sources of information  – namely, those that are unlikely to 
conflict with our pre-existing beliefs – compounds this problem further 
and shapes our choices of friends and news sources as well as social, 
religious, and political affiliations.85 These examples are closely related to 
83 Michael Ross and Fiore Sicoly, ‘Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution’, 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37:3 (1979), 322-36.
84 Albert H. Hastorf and Hadley Cantril, ‘They Saw a Game: A Case Study’, The Journal 
of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 49 (1954), 129-34.
85 Kate Sweeny et al., ‘Information Avoidance: Who, What, When, and Why’, Review of 
General Psychology, 14 (2010), 340–53 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0021288> [accessed 
33THE COMMON-CORE/DIVERSITY DILEMMA
confirmation bias, an extraordinarily potent and pervasive phenomenon 
that involves  – whether consciously or unconsciously  – the selective 
gathering of information or its interpretation in ways that confirm 
rather than challenge our preconceived beliefs (thus linking selective 
perception to the drive to minimise cognitive dissonance).
Numerous studies since Wason’s seminal work86 have demonstrated 
that we pay vastly disproportionate attention to information that confirms 
our beliefs, and neglect the crucial truth-seeking act of attempting 
to disconfirm currently held views. More recently, however, brain-
imaging studies have shown that when we have a strong emotional state 
motivating our reasoning (as commonly observed in political, religious, 
or other partisan thinking), our reasoning is qualitatively different from 
that seen in ‘cool’ reasoning tasks where emotion is being consciously 
regulated. Indeed, activation patterns in the aroused state suggest that 
we are being chemically rewarded for finding confirming evidence and 
for ignoring disconfirming information, regardless of its veracity.87 This 
supports Nickerson’s striking assessment:
If one were to attempt to identify a single problematic aspect of human 
reasoning that deserves attention above all others, the confirmation 
bias would have to be among the candidates for consideration. Many 
have written about this bias, and it appears to be sufficiently strong and 
pervasive that one is led to wonder whether the bias, by itself, might 
account for a  significant fraction of the disputes, altercations, and 
misunderstandings that occur among individuals, groups, and nations.88
Confirmation bias  – even without any other distorting effects  – casts 
great doubt on our ability to reason reliably, especially when emotionally 
invested (as all sides typically are when addressing religious questions). 
But it also primes us to overlook other biases (such as the HADD and ToM 
discussed above) and to prefer their irrational results, thus compounding 
other errors and prejudices, and helping to produce a  potent cocktail 
12/02/2015].
86 Peter C. Wason, ‘On the Failure to Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task’, 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology: Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 
12 (1960), 129–40.
87 Drew Westen and others, ‘Neural Bases of Motivated Reasoning: An fMRI Study 
of Emotional Constraints on Partisan Political Judgment in the 2004 US Presidential 
Election’, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 18 (2006), 1947–58.
88 Raymond S. Nickerson, ‘Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many 
Guises.’, Review of General Psychology, 2 (1998), 175-220.
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of reason-contaminating effects. Even people applying the scientific 
method,89 the best means yet devised to detect and correct such errors, 
must be monitored carefully to reduce the effects and incidences of these 
biases,90 a fact acknowledged in the recognition that many kinds of trials 
must be double-blind to be considered valid.
The Need for Significance and Social Cohesion
The interrelated biases mentioned so far also interact strongly with 
a  number of other processes and pressures that motivate individuals, 
cultures, and religious traditions to righteously assert their distinctiveness 
and importance in comparison to rivals. For example, the normal 
egocentric need for every individual to feel significant or special can be 
seen in the satisfaction of leader and proselyte in the perception that 
they are the ones that are right, chosen, or share special knowledge. We 
can add to this mix such familiar factors as childhood acceptance of 
authority, the social pressures of tradition and conformity, and processes 
of identity construction, not to mention the drive that most social 
organizations have to retain their identity and social influence.
From an  evolutionary point of view, it is not at all surprising that 
children naturally defer to the authority of adults and the traditions of 
their society. Indeed, humanity’s ability to copy effective behaviour (e.g. 
hunting, fishing, weaving, using astronomy to navigate or to schedule 
crop-planting) is a distinctive characteristic that has allowed us to succeed 
so extraordinarily as a  species.91 But beside these examples that have 
instrumentally clear goals, there is a vast array of other cultural elements 
that every individual must also learn but which have no instrumental 
explanation beyond being simply the ‘way things are done’ in a  given 
cultural context.92 Children have to learn the arbitrary meaning of 
89 See Robert N. McCauley, Why Religion Is Natural and Science Is Not (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), for a discussion of this issue relative to our topic.
90 See, for example, Joseph P. Simmons, Leif D. Nelson and Uri Simonsohn, False-
Positive Psychology: Undisclosed Flexibility in Data Collection and Analysis Allows 
Presenting Anything as Significant (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 23 
May 2011) <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1850704> [accessed 21/02/2014].
91 Victoria Horner and Andrew Whiten, ‘Causal Knowledge and Imitation/Emulation 
Switching in Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and Children (Homo sapiens)’, Animal 
Cognition, 8 (2005), 164–81 http://doi.org/10.1007/s10071-004-0239-6 [accessed 
8/3/2015].
92 Horner and Whiten, ‘Causal Knowledge and Imitation/Emulation Switching in 
Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and Children (Homo sapiens)’, p.164.
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numerous symbols – both linguistic and otherwise – as well as customs, 
social etiquette, religious rituals, and fashion; thus they are faced with 
a world of unexplained or inexplicable cultural norms that for the most 
part must simply be accepted and learned by rote or through imitation.
Learning all these arbitrary cultural elements is difficult and 
extraordinarily costly in time and effort  – what purpose could justify 
such investment in the absence of direct instrumental or pragmatic value? 
Anthropology’s increasingly persuasive answer is social cohesion,93 and 
evolutionary theory concurs, particularly with regard to the central role 
of religion. Evolutionary theories of the origin of religion have ranged 
from viewing it as a  directly biologically-based adaptation promoting 
cooperation94 to seeing it as a  fuzzy category with no distinctive 
biological basis, which merely incorporates the haphazard by-products 
of nonreligious cognitive processes.95 Between these two extremes is the 
view that religion may have started as a by-product of other cognitive 
processes but then, once it emerged, became culturally selected and 
further developed due to its strong survival value.96 Some important 
research has also recently suggested how religious beliefs might be 
related to the dual-processing model of normal human cognition,97 
a  promising framework to integrate with some of the religion-related 
biases and evidential claims surveyed earlier.
93 Harvey Whitehouse, ‘The Coexistence Problem in Psychology, Anthropology, 
and Evolutionary Theory’, Human Development, 54 (2011), 191–99 <http://dx.doi.
org/10.1159/000329149> [accessed 12/02/2015].
94 David Sloan Wilson, Darwin’s Cathedral: Evolution, Religion, and the Nature of 
Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).
95 Pascal Boyer, Religion Explained: The Human Instincts That Fashion God, Spirits and 
Ancestors (London: Vintage, 2002); Harvey Whitehouse, Modes of Religiosity: A Cognitive 
Theory of Religious Transmission (Walnut Creek, CA: Rowman Altamira, 2004).
96 Scott Atran and Joseph Henrich, ‘The Evolution of Religion: How Cognitive By-
Products, Adaptive Learning Heuristics, Ritual Displays, and Group Competition 
Generate Deep Commitments to Prosocial Religions’, Biological Theory, 5 (2010), 18–30. 
For a useful survey of explanatory approaches to religion ‘as a solution to the challenge 
of cooperation’, see Graham Wood, ‘Cognitive Science and Religious Belief ’, Philosophy 
Compass, 6/10 (2011), 734-45.
97 Nicolas Baumard and Pascal Boyer, ‘Religious Beliefs as Reflective Elaborations 
on Intuitions: A  Modified Dual-Process Model’, Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, 22 (2013), 295–300 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963721413478610> [accessed 
26/02/2015].
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Various other perspectives also suggest that social cohesion is 
a central function, and perhaps the primary raison d’être, of religion.98 
The word ‘religion’ itself has a long etymological history tracing back to 
the Latin root re-ligare meaning to bind or connect. And it is common 
for the religious to distrust atheists, fearing that society and its moral 
values would fall apart without supernatural belief.99 There may, indeed, 
be some degree of truth to this perception: reason-based social contracts 
that constrain individual interests to promote cooperation are more 
likely to fail than those with a  religious dimension, because in some 
circumstances defection can become selfishly rational, with relatively 
limited and calculable egoistic consequences (at least if supernatural 
retribution is discounted).100
Now it seems that we may not only have good naturalistic explanations 
for central features that religious traditions hold in common, but also 
common-core explanations for the processes that distinguish them and 
impede their dialogue with other worldviews. Ultimately what much of 
this literature suggests is that while we might outwardly acknowledge 
that we  – whether as individuals, ‘tribe’, or culture  – are not uniquely 
right in what we think or do, inwardly we almost irresistibly tend to 
think that we are.101 And this can apply just as much to naturalists as 
supernaturalists. So if we are serious about pursuing self-understanding, 
interreligious dialogue, or rational evaluation of disagreement, we must 
systematically compensate for a potent set of cognitive biases every step 
of the way, remaining constantly alert to our profound and pervasive 
ability to deceive ourselves as well as others. As Benjamin Franklin once 
98 Jesse Graham and Jonathan Haidt, ‘Beyond Beliefs: Religions Bind Individuals 
Into Moral Communities’, Personality and Social Psychology Review, 14 (2010), 140–50 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1088868309353415> [accessed 12/02/2015].
99 Penny Edgell, Joseph Gerteis and Douglas Hartmann, ‘Atheists As “Other”: Moral 
Boundaries and Cultural Membership in American Society’, American Sociological 
Review, 71 (2006), 211–34 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000312240607100203> [accessed 
12/02/2015].
100 Scott Atran and Jeremy Ginges, ‘Religious and Sacred Imperatives in Human 
Conflict’, Science, 336 (2012), 855–57 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1216902> 
[accessed 12/02/2015]; Richard Sosis and Eric R. Bressler, ‘Cooperation and Commune 
Longevity: A Test of the Costly Signaling Theory of Religion’, Cross-Cultural Research, 
37 (2003), 211–39 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1069397103037002003> [accessed 
12/02/2015].
101 Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and 
Religion (New York: Pantheon Books, 2012).
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observed, ‘so convenient a thing it is to be a reasonable creature, since it 
enables one to find or make a reason for everything one has a mind to 
do’.102
VII. NORMALITY, OBJECTIVITY, AND GROUP IDENTITY
We have seen that there are many natural factors conducive to religious 
belief, and although some of these generate relevant sensory evidence (e.g. 
religious and near-death experiences), most act by biasing the subject’s 
judgement or interpretation of experience, particularly in the direction 
of attributing events to invisible intelligent powers, and generally in 
cultural conformity with their society and religious upbringing. Hence 
it is not surprising that supernaturalists have often been accused of 
being ‘cognitively challenged’, a dismissive attitude that has sometimes 
drawn sustenance from studies showing a negative correlation between 
religiosity and intelligence.103 This effect, however, is small: a  meta-
analysis of 63 studies suggests a  modest negative correlation between 
intelligence and religious beliefs of -0.24, with an even weaker negative 
correlation between intelligence and religious practices.104 Moreover, 
large-scale studies controlling for relevant personality and demographic 
variables, like the US Christian sample analysed by G. J. Lewis et al., 
will likely continue to show that only about 1% of the variance even 
in fundamentalism is explained by intelligence; the percentage for 
less extreme religiosity is a  fraction of that, and the relationship may 
disappear entirely for spirituality.105 More importantly, even if religious 
102 Benjamin Franklin, The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin: With Related 
Documents, ed. by Louis Masur, 2nd edn (New York: Macmillan, 2003), p. 56.
103 E.g. Sharon Bertsch and Bryan J. Pesta, ‘The Wonderlic Personnel Test and 
Elementary Cognitive Tasks as Predictors of Religious Sectarianism, Scriptural 
Acceptance and Religious Questioning’, Intelligence, 37 (2009), 231–37; Richard Lynn, 
John Harvey and Helmuth Nyborg, ‘Average Intelligence Predicts Atheism Rates across 
137 Nations’, Intelligence, 37 (2009), 11–15; C.L. Reeve, ‘Expanding the G-Nexus: 
Further Evidence Regarding the Relations among National IQ, Religiosity and National 
Health Outcomes’, Intelligence, 37 (2009), 495–505 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
intell.2009.06.003> [accessed 12/02/2015].
104 Miron Zuckerman, Jordan Silberman and Judith A. Hall, ‘The Relation Between 
Intelligence and Religiosity: A  Meta-Analysis and Some Proposed Explanations’, 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 17 (2013), 325–54 <http://dx.doi.
org/10.1177/1088868313497266> [accessed 12/02/2015].
105 G.J. Lewis, S.J. Ritchie and T.C. Bates, ‘The Relationship between Intelligence 
and Multiple Domains of Religious Belief: Evidence from a  Large Adult US Sample’, 
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believers were on average several IQ points lower than non-believers, the 
obvious existence of so many extremely intelligent believers and equally 
unintelligent atheists makes clear the weakness of any general statistical 
argument for the irrationality of belief.
In fact, a  similarly disparaging counter-argument may now be 
attempted on the other side, suggesting that it is the disbeliever’s mind – 
rather than that of the believer  – which is abnormal and somehow 
deficient.106 In a  series of four studies on different populations, Ara 
Norenzayan et al. have shown that deficits related to empathising and 
theory of mind, as seen in persons with autism and those tending 
towards autism, were associated with significantly less belief in 
a personal God.107 In one such study, for instance, the participants with 
autism were only 11% as likely as matched normal controls to strongly 
endorse belief in God. But again, it is far too crude to assume that such 
a correlation demonstrates a determining general tendency, or implies 
some significant deficit on the part of all non-believers.
Other recent research might reframe this debate more helpfully. 
Gordon Pennycook et al., for example, have shown that both religious 
and paranormal belief can be partially explained by a  preference for 
an  intuitive, as opposed to analytical, cognitive style (rather than 
a  difference in ability).108 Moreover, a  series of carefully constructed 
studies on various samples has shown that levels of religious belief can 
be reduced by triggering people to use their already-existing analytic 
thinking abilities to solve unrelated problems.109 Thus it is vitally 
important to distinguish those who selectively choose not to think 
Intelligence, 39 (2011), 468–72 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2011.08.002> [accessed 
12/02/2015].
106 E.g. Kelly Clark, ‘Is Atheism “Normal”? Reflections from the Cognitive Science 
of Religion’ (Ian Ramsey Centre for Science and Religion, University of Oxford, 
2013) <http://www.ianramseycentre.info/videos/atheism-normal-csr.html> [accessed 
2/11/2013].
107 Ara Norenzayan, Will M. Gervais and Kali H. Trzesniewski, ‘Mentalizing Deficits 
Constrain Belief in a  Personal God’, PLoS ONE, 7 (2012), e36880 <http://dx.doi.
org/10.1371/journal.pone.0036880> [accessed 12/02/2015].
108 Gordon Pennycook and others, ‘Analytic Cognitive Style Predicts Religious 
and Paranormal Belief ’, Cognition, 123 (2012), 335–46 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
cognition.2012.03.003> [accessed 12/02/2015].
109 Will M. Gervais and Ara Norenzayan, ‘Analytic Thinking Promotes Religious 
Disbelief ’, Science, 336 (2012), 493–96 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1215647> 
[accessed 12/02/2015].
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systematically or scientifically about religious matters, from those who 
are simply incapable of doing so in general. Religiosity does not imply 
intellectual weakness, but it can involve motivated cognition and/or 
changes in cognitive style that, from the outside, can easily be mistaken 
for weakness.110
The suggestion that there is any place for choice in this matter might 
at first seem cognitively irresponsible, since it is commonly presupposed 
that epistemological duty requires us to ‘do our best’ to scout out the 
truth wherever it may lie. Against this presupposition, we have already 
remarked in §V how our hypersensitive agency detection device (HADD) 
and theory of mind (ToM) – sources of major cognitive biases associated 
with supernaturalist ‘irrationality’  – can be seen as evolutionarily 
useful.111 Another nearly universal human irrationality, the optimistic 
bias, likewise seems often to contribute to our individual and collective 
achievement and well-being,112 precisely by systematically distorting our 
judgements and perceptions in a positive direction. By contrast, studies 
of the phenomenon of ‘depressive realism’ indicate that the clinically 
depressed commonly have a more accurate perception of reality, as seen 
for example when estimating odds of success in an undertaking.113 But 
if depression is the price to pay for objectivity, then most of us would 
probably prefer to cling to our illusions, just as we might rationally prefer 
to be deceived if it would allow us to take full advantage of the healing 
powers of the placebo effect. Likewise, even if the considerations in §IV 
110 See the following articles for discussion of motivated cognition and how individuals, 
directed by their religious beliefs (and ideology more generally), change their cognitive 
style or limit their thinking in some domains in order to help insulate cultural elements 
or aspects of their worldview from change: Branden Miller, ‘Recovering the Full Wealth 
of Conviction and Cognition: Psychology’s Modernist Critique of Fundamentalism in 
Postmodern Perspective’, Journal of Faith and Science Exchange, 2 (1998), 91–103; John 
T. Jost and others, ‘Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition.’, Psychological 
Bulletin, 129 (2003), 339–75 <http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.339> 
[accessed 12/02/2015].
111 Though it is important not to take for granted that traits which are adaptations 
(arising from their usefulness in evolutionary history) will necessarily continue to be 
adaptive (i.e. useful for us) in the modern context.
112 E.g. Joelle C. Ruthig and others, ‘Academic Optimistic Bias: Implications for 
College Student Performance and Well-Being’, Social Psychology of Education, 10 (2007), 
115–37 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11218-006-9002-y> [accessed 12/02/2015].
113 Michael T. Moore and David M. Fresco, ‘Depressive Realism: A  Meta-Analytic 
Review’, Clinical Psychology Review, 32 (2012), 496–509 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
cpr.2012.05.004> [accessed 12/02/2015].
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and §V above intellectually persuade us that prayer and meditation 
give no access to the divine, we might well decide not only to continue 
with these practices but even to retain the refuted beliefs that underlie 
them, if we consider that supernatural belief and religious observance 
can enhance happiness,114 increase longevity,115 and facilitate desirable 
behavioural change such as recovery from addiction.116 Why should we 
heed the calls to epistemological duty, when harsh scientific objectivity 
is not only difficult and unnatural  – requiring years of education to 
develop – but also apparently leads to mental anguish rather than health? 
To put this in terms of a second dilemma:117
The Normal/Objective Dilemma
If the psychological causes of religious belief are associated with normal, 
healthy, mental functioning and various positive (individual and social) 
outcomes, should these rationally weigh with us more heavily than 
objective epistemological considerations would allow?
The social perspective introduced in §VI above is also particularly relevant 
here, especially given recent evidence that it is the very irrationality 
of religious beliefs that can make them so effective as means of social 
cohesion and community building. As Atran and Ginges suggest, ‘... costly 
and seemingly arbitrary ritual commitment to apparently absurd beliefs 
deepens trust, galvanizing group solidarity for common defense and 
blinding members to exit strategies’.118 This would help to explain extreme 
ritual practices (e.g. scarification, human sacrifice, genital mutilation, 
and traumatising initiations) as well as exclusivist, fundamentalist-style 
beliefs that seem oblivious to rational considerations. Groups holding 
114 Ellen Childs, ‘Religious Attendance and Happiness: Examining Gaps in the Current 
Literature – A Research Note’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 49 (2010), 550–
60 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5906.2010.01528.x> [accessed 12/02/2015].
115 Michael E. McCullough and others, ‘Religious Involvement and Mortality: A Meta-
Analytic Review’, Health Psychology, 19 (2000), 211–22 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0278-
6133.19.3.211> [accessed 12/02/2015].
116 Lambert, Fincham, Marks, and others, ‘Invocations and Intoxication: Does Prayer 
Decrease Alcohol Consumption?’.
117 In the light of our earlier discussions, the Normal/Objective Dilemma can also be 
expressed more generally as involving a choice between being more humanly ‘normal’ 
(by being irrational or biased in some respect), and being more ‘objective’, ‘rational’, or 
‘unbiased’ (and thus more humanly ‘abnormal’ in this same respect), in contexts where 
each choice is likely to entail some unrecognised costs and/or benefits.
118 Atran and Ginges, ‘Religious and Sacred Imperatives in Human Conflict’, p. 855.
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beliefs in fundamentalist ways tend to have a stronger sense of in-group 
trust, belonging, order, and identity. They also, however, tend to be more 
insular and xenophobic, and spend considerable time reaffirming and 
reiterating beliefs that often seem quite unreasonable to others, precisely 
because those beliefs – which form the all-important basis of their in-
group identity and community – are so vital to maintain.119
Religion, Intergroup Conflict and Globalisation
The dark side of the exclusivity and certainty that produces in-group 
cohesion is the conflict with out-groups and the common tendency to 
vilify the ‘other’ that it also creates. For most of human history, it has 
been entirely typical to consider some of these ‘others’ as wholly ‘evil’ 
people, often associated with a duty for the rest of ‘us’ to separate and 
then destroy them.120 Pluralist supernatural beliefs, as well as orthodox 
religious teachings of tolerance, may neutralise or limit some of this 
aggression and discrimination,121 but overall – as one meta-analysis of 
race in the US has recently confirmed – it appears that the large majority 
of religious humanitarianism is still expressed towards our particular 
in-group.122 And cross-cultural research is making it increasingly 
clear that prejudice and religiosity tend to correlate with each another 
across the globe,123 whether measured by self-report or more implicit 
methods.124 The relationship is not, however, uncomplicated, and 
119 Thornhill-Miller, ‘Recovering the Full Wealth of Conviction and Cognition: 
Psychology’s Modernist Critique of Fundamentalism in Postmodern Perspective’.
120 Jordan B. Peterson, Maps of Meaning: The Architecture of Belief (New York: 
Routledge, 1999).
121 Bruce Hunsberger, ‘Religion and Prejudice: The Role of Religious Fundamentalism, 
Quest, and Right-Wing Authoritarianism’, Journal of Social Issues, 51 (1995), 113–29 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1995.tb01326.x> [accessed 12/02/2015].
122 Deborah L. Hall, David C. Matz and Wendy Wood, ‘Why Don’t We Practice 
What We Preach? A Meta-Analytic Review of Religious Racism’, Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 14 (2010), 126–39 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1088868309352179> 
[accessed 12/02/2015].
123 Peer Scheepers, Mèrove Gijsberts and Evelyn Hello, ‘Religiosity and Prejudice 
against Ethnic Minorities in Europe: Cross-National Tests on a Controversial Relationship’, 
Review of Religious Research, 43 (2002), 242–65 <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3512331> 
[accessed 12/02/2015].
124 Megan K. Johnson, Wade C. Rowatt and Jordan LaBouff, ‘Priming Christian 
Religious Concepts Increases Racial Prejudice’, Social Psychological and Personality 
Science, 1 (2010), 119–26 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1948550609357246> [accessed 
12/02/2015]; Jonathan E. Ramsay and others, ‘Rethinking Value Violation: Priming 
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a more fine-grained approach would seem to suggest that prejudice, in 
general, is most strongly associated with the authoritarian aspects of 
fundamentalism.  Nonetheless, some kinds of prejudice and conflict (e.g. 
concerning homosexuals, women, or members of other religious groups) 
often still seem directly associated with mere orthodoxy of religious 
belief.125 All these trends are complicated by individual differences 
in personality, context, and religious doctrine, but the overall picture 
appears consistent: for some strong believers – often those most likely 
to be strident and influential within a  devout community  – the very 
existence of other people living happily and well according to an entirely 
different symbolic belief system can constitute a threat and a potential 
source of aggression.126
The wars, pogroms, and discrimination that result from in-group/
out-group processes, are, of course, not the exclusive product of religion 
or supernatural beliefs, since ideologies and tribalism of all kinds can 
produce such divides. A war survey carried out by the BBC even suggests 
that non-religious absolutist ideologies and forms of tribalism have been 
responsible for more war, death, and destruction in recorded history 
than purely religious motivations.127 But clearly supernatural belief 
systems – and those that involve certainty and exclusivity in particular – 
constitute a  significant part of the problem, especially when (beyond 
the examples already cited) the mere implicit contextual presence of 
religious symbols is shown to increase intergroup bias even among the 
non-religious.128
Religion Increases Prejudice in Singaporean Christians and Buddhists’, International 
Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 24 (2014), 1–15 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/105086
19.2012.761525> [accessed 12/02/2015].
125 Bruce Hunsberger and Lynne M. Jackson, ‘Religion, Meaning, and Prejudice’, Journal 
of Social Issues, 61 (2005), 807–26 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.2005.00433.x> 
[accessed 12/02/2015].
126 Jordan B Peterson and Metanexus Cogito, ‘Neuropsychology and Mythology of 
Motivation for Group Aggression’, Encyclopedia of violence, peace and conflict, 1999, 
529–45.
127 Greg Austin, Todd Kranock and Thom Oommen, ‘God and War: An  Audit 
and an  Exploration’, BBC, 2003. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/
world/04/war_audit_pdf/pdf/war_audit.pdf> [accessed 12/02/2015].
128 Jordan P. LaBouff and others, ‘Differences in Attitudes Toward Outgroups in 
Religious and Nonreligious Contexts in a Multinational Sample: A Situational Context 
Priming Study’, International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 22 (2012), 1–9 <http://
dx.doi.org/10.1080/10508619.2012.634778> [accessed 12/02/2015].
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The rise over the past century of various forms of fundamentalist-style 
religious belief in response to globalisation has recently crescendoed, 
arguably becoming a  defining characteristic and source of conflict in 
our age.129 Some progress has been made in understanding both the 
conflicts between these extremist groups, and the collision course they 
have set with the rest of the world. For example, various triggers of 
uncertainty,130 meaning, or worldview threats, and reminders of death131 
have all been shown to increase both religious zealotry and intergroup 
prejudice. In the context of our vastly expanded destructive power, there 
is particular danger in the current cocktail of clashing cultures, with 
a modern crisis of identity and meaning-making at its core.132 Overall, 
then, if consideration of the practical benefit of holding religious beliefs 
is admissible in the naturalism/supernaturalism debate, we would 
argue that again there is much greater reason to discourage rather than 
encourage first-order supernaturalist beliefs. The in-group benefits to be 
gained are outweighed by the actual and potential out-group damage. 
And with such massive destructive power increasingly wielded around 
the world, there is perhaps today no greater threat to humanity than 
intergroup conflict motivated by exclusivist and other-worldly religious 
thinking.133
129 Branden Thornhill-Miller, ‘The Modern Missionary Position: The Psychology 
of Fundamentalist Sects in Global Context’ (65th Annual Minns Lecture series, ‘The 
Experience of Religious Varieties: Psychology of Religion for the 21st Century’, Harvard 
University, Boston, MA, 2007), available at: <http://www.minnslectures.org/archive/
thornhillmiller/thornhillmiller.html> [accessed 12/02/2015]; Michael B. Salzman, 
‘Globalization, Religious Fundamentalism and the Need for Meaning’, International 
Journal of Intercultural Relations, 32 (2008), 318–27 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
ijintrel.2008.04.006> [accessed 12/02/2015].
130 Ian McGregor, Kyle Nash and Mike Prentice, ‘Reactive Approach Motivation 
(RAM) for Religion’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99 (2010), 148–61 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0019702> [accessed 12/02/2015].
131 Zachary K. Rothschild, Abdolhossein Abdollahi and Tom Pyszczynski, ‘Does 
Peace Have a  Prayer? The Effect of Mortality Salience, Compassionate Values, and 
Religious Fundamentalism on Hostility toward out-Groups’, Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 45 (2009), 816–27 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2009.05.016> 
[accessed 12/02/2015].
132 Branden Thornhill-Miller, ‘The Modern Missionary Position: The Psychology of 
Fundamentalist Sects in Global Context’.
133 Branden Thornhill-Miller, ‘Critical Factors for the Long-Term Survival of 
Humanity’, in Humanity 3000 Seminar Proceedings, 3, 1 vols. (Seattle, Washington: 
Foundation For the Future, 2001), pp. 49–50.
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VIII. RECONCILIATION, SECOND-ORDER RELIGION, 
AND THE MAXIM OF THE MOON
Since the Enlightenment, many Western intellectuals  – and social 
scientists in particular  – have anticipated the death of religion as 
a  leftover relic of our primitive past and a  form of institutionalised 
ignorance.134 Recent experience, however, might suggest instead the 
death of this ‘secularization hypothesis’, as religious influence reasserts 
itself around the world and psychological research (some of which we 
have discussed) discovers why supernatural thinking is so ‘intuitive’ 
and so hard to eliminate even when the effort is made. Science and 
technology, once seen as religion’s executioners, continue their relentless 
advance into every corner of modern life. But supernaturalism, instead 
of being displaced by scientific thinking, seems to find increasingly 
sophisticated ways of coexisting with it in the various domains of 
everyday life, the two either accepted simultaneously, or hybridised, 
or used alternately (typically without conflict and often even without 
awareness).135 Such ‘explanatory coexistence’, whereby humans appear to 
understand the world in both naturalistic and supernaturalistic terms, 
can be conceptualised in various ways,136 but would seem irrational from 
typical philosophical and scientific points of view. Harvey Whitehouse 
has argued, however, that instead of viewing supernaturalist thinking 
primarily in ‘intellectualist’ terms, as a  rival attempt to make sense of 
the world, anthropological perspectives suggest that we should consider 
equally its ‘psychological’ impact (e.g. feelings of comfort and control in 
the face of uncertainty) and its ‘functionalist’ role (e.g. how it functions 
to maintain and reproduce social institutions that meet individuals’ 
134 Jeffrey K. Hadden, ‘Toward Desacralizing Secularization Theory’, Social Forces, 65 
(1987), 587-611 <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2578520> [accessed 12/02/2015]. However 
David Hume, by far the most important philosophical source of religious scepticism 
over the period concerned, seems to have considered that ‘superstitious delusion’ will 
continue ‘as long as the world endures’ (E 10.2).
135 E. Margaret Evans and Jonathan D. Lane, ‘Contradictory or Complementary? 
Creationist and Evolutionist Explanations of the Origin(s) of Species’, Human 
Development, 54 (2011), 144–59 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/000329130> [accessed 
12/02/2015]; Paul L. Harris, ‘Conflicting Thoughts about Death’, Human Development, 
54 (2011), 160–68 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/000329133> [accessed 12/02/2015].
136 Cristine H. Legare and Aku Visala, ‘Between Religion and Science: Integrating 
Psychological and Philosophical Accounts of Explanatory Coexistence’, Human 
Development, 54 (2011), 169–84 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/000329135> [accessed 
12/02/2015].
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biological needs).137 Functionally, naturalistic and supernaturalistic 
thinking can be seen as outcomes of two different human learning 
systems, the one oriented towards ‘understanding and managing physical-
causal relationships in a mechanistic fashion’, and the other ‘concerned 
with understanding and managing social relationships in a  normative 
and deferential fashion’.138 So even though supernaturalist beliefs serve 
poorly as explanations of how the world works, they might be seen as 
well-motivated – even ‘rational’ in a sense – if they function effectively 
to improve individual well-being and to supply the norms and customs 
that hold communities together.139
Perhaps the various practical benefits of religion to the individual – 
social support, sense of meaning and security, comfort in times of grief, 
prayer-placebo  – could equally well be delivered by non-supernatural 
means (e.g. non-religious group membership and forms of meditation, 
psychotherapy, etc.). However, as David Wulff summarises B.F. Skinner’s 
view expressed near his retirement, ‘Religion may be necessary for 
ordinary people ... [because some aspects of it] could be replaced only 
through an extraordinary management effort’.140 That is to say, the very 
naturalness of religion gives some reason to doubt its easy replaceability, 
historically immersed as we are in well-established religious traditions 
whose rituals have evolved to fit human needs.141
Faced with this situation, the idea of ‘coexistence’  – allowing both 
science and religion to play an  important part in one’s life, without 
either threatening the other – may seem pragmatically attractive, even 
if of doubtful intellectual coherence. One problem here is that some of 
the desired effects of religious belief (e.g. in-group trust, reduction of 
existential uncertainty, prayer-placebo) appear to depend significantly 
137 Harvey Whitehouse, ‘The Coexistence Problem in Psychology, Anthropology, and 
Evolutionary Theory’, p. 191.
138 Whitehouse, ‘The Coexistence Problem in Psychology, Anthropology, and 
Evolutionary Theory’, p. 191.
139 Scott Atran, In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion (Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
140 David M. Wulff, Psychology of Religion: Classic and Contemporary, 2nd edn 
(Oxford, England: John Wiley and Sons, 1997), p. 135.
141 But who can say how things might look and feel after another hundred or thousand 
years of objective scientific enquiry and secular cultural development? For another 
helpful review of the adaptive functions of religious traditions, and the challenges 
faced by sciences that would replace them, see Wulff, Psychology of Religion: Classic and 
Contemporary, pp. 156–8.
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on a firm, exclusivist-style certainty in one’s convictions. And particularly 
in the light of our Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma, such certainty is 
extremely hard to reconcile with taking science and critical thinking 
at all seriously. It also, as we have seen, almost inevitably fosters  – at 
least amongst some individuals  – the out-group hostility which is so 
dangerous as even to represent a challenge to our collective survival in 
the modern context.
Thus, from a rational, empirically-informed point of view, there seem 
to be two plausible ways forward: walking a path either of scepticism or of 
reconciliation. The austere intellectual response to the considerations in 
this paper (more likely to appeal to the sceptical Humean) may be to ‘bite 
the bullet’ of cool, parsimonious reason and learn to live with a godless 
world, something that many unbelievers have apparently managed well 
and which might – with sustained effort and perhaps sensitive reshaping 
of social structures  – turn out to be possible for nearly all of us. The 
more subtle (and less intellectually straightforward) response is to 
abandon the competing dogmatisms of first-order supernaturalism and 
instead fall back onto an undogmatic version of its second-order cousin, 
finding intimations of divinity in the general structures of the world and 
in our own religious instincts, while remaining fully committed to the 
enterprise of natural science. On this understanding of things, although 
creation is seen as ultimately deriving from a supernatural source, that 
source is distant and unknowable, and the role of science is to reveal the 
proximate foundation of our existence: the empirical universe through 
whose causal processes we have been made. Thus even while believing 
that the world itself is ultimately created and sustained by a  guiding 
supernatural power, our scientific and historical enquiry can proceed in 
the same way as for the atheist, without resort to magical or supernatural 
intervention in the causal order.142
142 Unless, of course, such first-order supernatural intervention turns out to be well 
evidenced even in the teeth of sceptical considerations such as the Common-Core/
Diversity Dilemma. Recall again that the Dilemma is empirically based, and does not 
rule out the possibility of future good evidence for first-order supernatural intrusions 
into nature. For a  more optimistic approach somewhat along these lines, see Kelly 
James Clark and Justin L. Barrett, ‘Reidian Religious Epistemology and the Cognitive 
Science of Religion’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 79 (2011), 639-75, 
who suggest that our evolved tendencies to see purpose in the world constitute a non-
specific ‘god-faculty’ (pp. 652-4) that can properly be ascribed default authority (on the 
principles of Thomas Reid), but can also be supported by personal religious experience 
(pp. 667-70).
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As explained in the introduction to this paper, such second-order 
supernaturalism has become increasingly attractive in recent years, 
owing to developments not only in the psychology of religion but also 
in the philosophy of religion, where the Fine Tuning Argument points in 
precisely this direction. Unsurprisingly, the assessment of the argument 
is disputed, but we doubt that it is decisively refutable given the current 
state of knowledge,143 as long as its conclusion is suitably restricted.144 
Moreover, some popular attempts to rebut it appeal to the idea of 
selection effects operating over a multitude of universes, a controversial 
view which goes radically beyond any experienced reality and could 
perhaps reasonably be considered metaphysically extravagant.145 This 
position might well change, however, and in the future – possibly a distant 
future  – the development of physics will probably either strengthen 
or weaken the argument, for example by either corroborating the 
naturalistic inexplicability of the ‘anthropic coincidences’, by explaining 
them away, or by vindicating the notion of an evolutionary or selective 
multiverse. But in the meantime, it is not obviously unreasonable to base 
one’s religious commitments on this optimistic second-order theistic 
view, as long as it remains unrefuted and seems to bring substantial 
psychological and social benefits. Perhaps by the time human physics 
has settled this issue, we shall also be in a better situation to judge how 
well different aspects of human society can cope without religion (for 
better or worse).
Those who pursue this second-order path will be faced with the 
question of how to reap the desirable benefits of religion while remaining 
143 A contrast with other traditional theistic arguments, since we view Ontological 
Arguments as logically refutable (Peter Millican, ‘The One Fatal Flaw in Anselm’s 
Argument’, Mind, 113 (2004), 437–76), Cosmological Arguments as vitiated by their 
reliance on general principles that seem initially plausible but go hugely beyond the scope 
of our experience, and Moral Arguments as founded on meta-ethical views that are both 
dubious in themselves and hostage to naturalistic accounts of morality. But these topics 
are obviously too big to discuss further here.
144 For example, we doubt whether the Argument can legitimately be taken to point 
towards a morally perfect creator, given that a morally defective (or indifferent) creator 
might equally be motivated to create a finely-tuned universe. For more brief remarks 
on its strengths and weaknesses, see Peter Millican, ‘Critical Survey of the Literature on 
Hume and the First Enquiry’, in Reading Hume on Human Understanding, ed. by Peter 
Millican (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), pp. 413–74 (pp. 460–1).
145 Hence dismissal of the Fine Tuning Argument on this basis cannot so easily claim 
the traditional atheistic virtue of ontological parsimony.
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above the first-order fray of disagreement, irrationality, and dogmatism. 
But in seeking a means of religious expression – both in thought and 
action  – they will inevitably be drawn towards religious language 
and practices that differentiate them from others pursuing a  similar 
path elsewhere in the world, often without being able to provide any 
convincing rationale for these differences (for reasons explained in 
this paper).146 The obvious prescription is for an undogmatic and non-
prejudicial acceptance of these differences as cultural preferences rather 
than matters of existential conflict. And crucially, such acceptance is far 
easier to achieve at the second-order level, for here the divine is taken 
to provide the source and sustenance of nature in general, rather than 
a causal agent influencing human history directly through specific (and 
cross-culturally disputed) actions, commandments, and sacred texts.
One way of conceptualising this undogmatic approach to cultural 
religious practices is based on the oral teachings attributed to the 
Buddha in the Surangama Sutra. Formulated as a general principle that 
has been dubbed the ‘Maxim of the Moon’,147 it cautions us against the 
blinding force of human cognitive bias by suggesting that all our pursuits 
of knowledge – including all our religions – are like ‘fingers pointing at 
the moon’. The problem is that too often we mistake our own finger for 
the moon and allow it to eclipse our view. The moon, like the Truth, is 
a distant, intangible beauty that we cannot bring fully into our presence, 
and as the psychological literature now so richly illustrates, when we try 
to apprehend it, rather than sharing a pure vision of what is really there, 
much of what we find is instead a shadowy reflection of our own, limited 
self. It is, however, both a  fundamental scientific objective and a basic 
religious teaching that we should strive to see beyond our own ‘pointing 
fingers’, in order to reach more truth in what they so emphatically attempt 
to indicate.
146 This is not to say that religious language and practice will be taken uncritically 
from the prevailing culture, making second-order religion outwardly indistinguishable 
from its first-order source. For example, this undogmatic second-order approach is likely 
to put considerably more emphasis on inclusive religious ritual – in which people can 
participate whatever their belief – than on the recitation of creeds designed to exclude 
the unorthodox.
147 Branden Thornhill-Miller, ‘We Sing the Body Eclectic’, First and Second Church in 
Boston (Boston, Massachusetts: WERS 88.9 FM, 1996); Thornhill-Miller, ‘The Modern 
Missionary Position: The Psychology of Fundamentalist Sects in Global Context’.
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How much of the moon is genuinely revealed by our cultural 
religious pointers, and how much eclipsed by them, is very unclear. In 
respect of first-order supernaturalism, however, the Common-Core/
Diversity Dilemma suggests that once we have rationally removed all 
the overlapping fingers associated with our different religions, there may 
be no distinguishing traits left to view. From this perspective, first-order 
supernaturalism would now appear to be more a trick of the light than 
any solid reality, a tapestry of seductive visions perhaps, but considerably 
less helpful, necessary, or convincing today than in our human past. But 
there may be another vision of the moon, as a  luminous, second-order 
ultimate reality of some kind that yet lies beyond the comprehension 
of all our individual efforts to point to it. We have seen how first-order 
religions, as inspired and inspiring human products, collectively reveal 
a great deal about us. In thus helping us to understand ourselves, they 
may also be thought to offer a reflection of second-order mysteries and 
wonders that yet still lie beyond our grasp.148 
148 The authors would like to thank Prof. Winfried Löffler, Dr Mark Sheskin, Dr 
Gregory Shushan, Rev. Dr Michael Spath, and Prof. David Wulff, for their very helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
